Firefighter Union President’s First Amendment Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss in South Carolina Case
A federal district court in South Carolina has denied, in large part, a motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed against the City of Greenville and its fire chief by a firefighter who alleges he was terminated for communicating concerns about department operations and morale while serving as union president.
According to the complaint, Gregory Cargill was employed by the Greenville City Fire Department (GCFD) and served as president of Greenville City Professional Firefighters, IAFF Local 2261. On August 26, 2024, Cargill requested a meeting with Fire Chief Brian Horton to discuss issues of mutual concern between the union and the department. Chief Horton responded two days later, stating that the City would not engage in collective bargaining but offering to meet with Cargill “Chief to firefighter,” directing him to use the chain of command to arrange any meeting or other communications.
On September 9, 2024, Cargill attended a city council meeting and asked Councilmember Dorothy Dowe for a meeting. He later sent emails to Dowe expressing concerns about departmental morale. On October 10, 2024, Cargill emailed Chief Horton explaining that his communications were not a request for union recognition or collective bargaining, but rather an effort to discuss issues affecting firefighters and the department.
Two days later, Cargill sent a detailed letter on union letterhead to the city manager identifying what he described as serious departmental concerns. The letter addressed issues including safety during emergency calls, training procedures, apparatus organization, class availability and funding, shift scheduling, and a policy restricting firefighters from congregating in apparatus bays. The letter also described what Cargill characterized as a culture of fear and declining morale within the department. He referenced his prior experience in a Florida fire department and suggested that using an outside firm to assess organizational culture could help rebuild trust.
On October 20, 2024, Cargill attended a meeting during which Chief Horton presented him with a termination memorandum citing insubordination and violation of the chain of command. The termination letter stated that Cargill violated city policy by contacting the city manager, communicating with the councilmember, and corresponding with the chief without first scheduling a meeting through the chain of command. The letter also cited Cargill’s direct contact with the councilmember at a meeting without first seeking permission from the chief. At the time of his termination, Cargill was still a probationary employee and had no internal appeal rights.
Cargill filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. His claims included retaliation for protected speech, interference with his right of association based on his union role, interference with his right to petition the government, and a claim alleging an unconstitutional prior restraint based on policies requiring firefighters to communicate concerns through the chain of command rather than through the union. He sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Cargill’s First Amendment speech claim. The court concluded that Cargill plausibly alleged that his communications addressed matters of public concern. The court noted that his letter raised concerns about departmental safety, training, morale, and operational effectiveness, issues that relate to a fire department’s ability to carry out its public mission.
The court also found that the Pickering balancing test used to weigh an employee’s speech rights against the government’s interest in maintaining efficient operations could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. The court noted that such balancing typically involves factual questions and that the complaint did not establish that Cargill’s communications disrupted departmental operations or discipline.
The court likewise denied the motion to dismiss the freedom of association claim. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the claim was implausible because the department previously knew of Cargill’s union involvement. The court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that he was terminated because of his union advocacy and noted that federal Constitutional law protects the right to associate with and advocate through a union even where public-sector collective bargaining is not required.
The court also denied the motion to dismiss Cargill’s petition claim, finding that his communications with city officials could constitute protected petitions regarding matters of public concern. The court stated that the facts alleged allowed a plausible inference that his criticisms of departmental leadership, rather than simple insubordination, motivated his termination.
However, the court dismissed without prejudice Cargill’s prior restraint claim. The court concluded that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege elements required to establish an unconstitutional prior restraint, including whether the chain-of-command policy required advance approval based on content or involved discretionary decision-making.
The court also dismissed the claims against Chief Horton in his official capacity as duplicative of the claims against the City. However, the court denied dismissal of the claims against Horton in his individual capacity, rejecting his argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. The court concluded that the complaint alleged retaliation for protected speech implicating clearly established constitutional rights.
The court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss only as to the prior restraint claim and the official-capacity claims against the chief, and denied the motion in all other respects. Here is a copy of the decision.
