Federal Court Dismisses Chicago Firefighter’s Suit Over Fitness-for-Duty Testing

A U.S. District Court judge has dismissed a lawsuit filed by a veteran Chicago firefighter who claimed she was subjected to unnecessary and retaliatory medical and psychological evaluations.

Lee Ann McKay, a firefighter for the Chicago Fire Department since 1999, has filed several prior employment-related suits against the City. More on an earlier case we covered in 2024. In this case, she alleged that CFD officials, the Office of the Inspector General, and certain medical professionals required her to undergo psychological and medical evaluations as retaliation for her complaints about discrimination and harassment in the department. The suit was filed in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

According to the complaint, McKay reported co-worker harassment in early 2024. After an alleged harasser was criminally charged that January, McKay expressed sympathy for the victim and said the harassment against her intensified. She was interviewed by the Inspector General’s Office, and in May 2024 two OIG investigators came to her home unannounced. McKay said the early-morning home visit left her feeling threatened, although she acknowledged that the investigators did not do anything beyond knocking on her door.

In June 2024, while discussing the harassment with a supervisor, McKay became emotional. Although she said this was momentary, others insisted she be transported for evaluation. She was discharged within a half hour but was placed on medical leave. She later reported additional threatening or intimidating interactions with CFD officials following subsequent OIG interviews.

On July 11, 2024, McKay was evaluated by Dr. Nicole Patino, Chief Medical Director for the Office of Public Safety Administration. Dr. Patino took her blood pressure—which McKay acknowledges was slightly elevated—and informed her that she needed to complete a mental capacity fitness-for-duty exam. McKay refused to answer what she described as invasive questions. In the mental exam that followed, she declined to provide a full list of alleged discrimination events because of ongoing litigation. The psychologist ultimately found her fit for duty.

Despite that clearance, Dr. Patino ordered additional physical testing, citing the elevated blood pressure reading and McKay’s history of asthma. McKay was directed to complete an OSHA respirator questionnaire, spirometry, and an examination by a pulmonologist. McKay objected, noting that she had been on the job for 25 years, had not worn an SCBA for over a decade, and believed the testing was unnecessary and unsafe due to drug allergies. When she was informed that the pulmonary function test would be administered in three parts—including portions using albuterol and methacholine—she refused to take the drug-based tests. Dr. Patino informed her that without completing the full testing suite she would not be cleared to return to duty.

McKay sued, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, as well as state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with employment.

The court dismissed all federal claims.

Judge Jorge Alonso held that neither the home visit by OIG investigators nor the psychological questioning constituted a “search” or “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. The court cited established precedent that “merely asking questions is not a search or seizure,” even when personal information is sought. The judge explained that “a psychological evaluation is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes,” and that a home visit to ask questions, without more, does not violate the Constitution.

As for the pulmonary testing, the court explained that even if it constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the defendants were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law prohibited the testing under the circumstances. The judge opted to leave the  question open on whether pulmonary function testing for firefighters is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and if so whether qualifies as a reasonable search for which a search warrant is not required. Neither issue needed to be decided since in the absence of clearly established precedent, officials had qualified immunity and thus could not be held liable.

McKay’s argument that the testing was retaliatory did not affect the qualified-immunity analysis because Fourth Amendment standards are objective and do not consider alleged ulterior motives. Objective medical considerations—such as the elevated blood pressure and documented asthma history—were noted as part of the record.

She also claimed that forcing her to remain at home while on medical leave was unconstitutional. Quoting from the decision:

• Plaintiff also argues in her response brief that CFD’s policy of requiring employees on medical leave to confine themselves to their homes is unconstitutional.
• The Court fails to see how this argument is pertinent to any of the claims Plaintiff has raised in her complaint.
• Additionally, the Court doubts whether the defendants in this case are the appropriate parties to sue over this department-wide policy.
• To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to constructively amend her complaint in her opposition brief, such amendments are “rarely . . . appropriate.”

Because McKay failed to establish any constitutional violation, the § 1983 conspiracy claim also failed. The court further noted that although she referenced the Fourteenth Amendment, she did not advance a separate equal protection theory; any such claim was deemed forfeited for purposes of the motion.

With the federal claims dismissed, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law counts. The entire complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and McKay was granted leave to amend by January 9, 2026, if she can assert a plausible federal claim consistent with the court’s order.

Judge Alonso also cautioned that any amended complaint must correct what he called “improper group pleading,” noting that each defendant “is entitled to know what he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful.”