Federal Court Concludes Fire Code Imposes Just Cause Requirement to Remove Fire Chief

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has denied a motion to dismiss a lawsuit by former fire chief, Ronald Lammers, against the City of Riverview and its city manager. Chief Lammers was summarily terminated shortly after he objected to the elimination of his deputy chief.

Chief Lammers began working for the City of Riverview in 2007 and was appointed fire chief in 2018. In 2022, Jeffrey Dobek became city manager. In January 2024, the department’s supervisor group organized a union, which included the deputy fire chief. Two months later, Dobek advised Chief Lammers that the deputy fire chief position would be eliminated for budgetary reasons. Chief Lammers opposed the decision, telling Dobek, human resources, and city council members that it was not cost-effective and compromised public safety.

According to the complaint, Dobek instructed Chief Lammers to bring concerns only to him and stop raising objections with others. In July 2024, Dobek terminated Chief Lammers’ employment verbally, without prior notice or a hearing. Chief Lammers sued, alleging (1) a violation of his procedural due process rights, (2) breach of implied contract, and (3) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

The defendants moved to dismiss Counts I (due process) and III (breach of implied contract), arguing that Chief Lammers was an at-will employee under the city code and not entitled to due process protections.  The court provides an excellent review of the law related to at-will employment and due process (Citations and quotation marks removed to make reading easier).

• Lammers argues that he had a protected property interest as a public employee and was deprived of procedural due process when his employment was terminated without notice or a hearing. 
• The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State … shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
• Procedural due process claims are analyzed under a two-part test. 
• First, the court must determine whether the interest at stake is a protected liberty or property right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
• Only after identifying such a right [does a court] continue to consider whether the deprivation of that interest contravened notions of due process.
• Whether Lammers had a protected property interest in his fire chief position depends on state law. 
• To establish a property interest, he must point to some statutory or contractual right conferred by the state which supports a legitimate claim to continued employment. 
• A showing that a public employee may be fired only for cause is sufficient to satisfy the first step of the analysis. 
• Under Michigan law, employment contracts for an indefinite duration are presumptively terminable at the will of either party for any reason or for no reason at all.
• An employee can overcome the presumption of at-will employment with sufficient proof either of a contractual provision for a definite term of employment or a provision forbidding discharge absent just cause.
• Michigan courts have recognized the following three ways by which a plaintiff can prove such contractual terms: (1) proof of a contractual provision for a definite term of employment or a provision forbidding discharge absent just cause; (2) an express agreement, either written or oral, regarding job security that is clear and unequivocal; or (3) a contractual provision, implied at law, where an employer’s policies and procedures instill a legitimate expectation of job security in the employee.

From here the case gets quite interesting. Chief Lammers argues that the City’s adoption of the 2015 International Fire Code (IFC), is the basis for a protected property interest in his employment. The IFC states that a “fire code official shall not be removed from office except for cause and after full opportunity to be heard on specific and relevant charges.” The IFC defines the fire code official as the fire chief or equivalent authority.

The City argued that Section 4.5 of its municipal code expressly provided that the fire chief served at the pleasure of the city manager, and that adoption of the IFC did not alter employment terms. The court disagreed, noting that the City adopted the IFC in its entirety in 2022, made several modifications, but did not exclude Section 103.2 (the just-cause provision). The court concluded it was reasonable to infer that the IFC superseded the earlier at-will provision, and that Lammers could reasonably expect just-cause protection.

Because Chief Lammers sufficiently alleged he had a legitimate expectation of continued employment and was terminated without notice or a hearing, the court found his due process and implied contract claims could proceed. The court did not address Chief Lammers’ First Amendment claim.

Here is a copy of the complaint: