Court Holds FDNY Not Liable in EMS Dispatch and Transport Case

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court has ruled as a matter of law, that FDNY cannot be held liable for their initial decision to dispatch a basic life support ambulance as opposed to paramedics to an incident scene, or the later decision of EMTs to await the arrival of paramedics rather than transport a patient immediately to the hospital. That ruling arose in a case filed by Dynell Fountaine and Anita Walker-Rodriguez alleging the city was responsible for the brain injuries Walker-Rodriguez sustained on November 2, 2015.

The facts as explained in the decision are as follows:

• On November 2, 2015… Fountaine called 911 to request an ambulance for his wife, Walker-Rodriguez, who was experiencing difficulty breathing.
• Based upon the information received from Fountaine, a 911 dispatcher sent a BLS ambulance to the scene, as opposed to an ALS ambulance.
• Within minutes, the BLS ambulance, staffed by emergency medical technicians, arrived at the plaintiffs’ apartment.
• The EMTs assessed Walker-Rodriguez, who was unresponsive, and promptly contacted a dispatcher to request an ALS ambulance, staffed by paramedics.
• After learning that the ALS ambulance was approximately 12 minutes away, the EMTs decided to continue treating Walker-Rodriguez in the apartment while they waited for the paramedics to arrive, instead of immediately transporting her to a nearby hospital, which was 5 minutes away.
• Upon arrival, the paramedics rendered treatment to Walker-Rodriguez, but attempts at intubation were unsuccessful.
• The EMTs and paramedics ultimately placed Walker-Rodriguez in an ambulance and transported her to the nearby hospital where she was successfully intubated. Walker-Rodriguez allegedly suffered injuries, including brain damage, as a result of the incident.

The couple filed suit in Kings County Supreme Court alleging negligence on the part of dispatchers and EMTs. The city’s motion to have the case dismissed and/or have summary judgment granted in their favor, was denied, prompting the city to appeal to the Appellate Division. In reversing the trial court, the Appellate division held as follows (citations and quotation marks removed to facilitate reading):

• When a negligence claim is asserted against a municipality, the first issue for a court to decide is whether the municipal entity was engaged in a proprietary function or acted in a governmental capacity at the time the claim arose.
• A municipality is subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence when it is engaged in a proprietary function, whereas it may only be held liable when acting in a governmental capacity if the plaintiff proves the existence of a special duty as an element of his or her negligence cause of action.
• A special duty can arise… when the government entity voluntarily assumes a duty to the plaintiff beyond what is owed to the public generally.
• However, even if a plaintiff satisfies the burden of demonstrating that a special duty exists, a municipality acting in a discretionary governmental capacity may rely on the governmental function immunity defense, an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the municipality.
• The defense shields public entities from liability for discretionary acts taken during the performance of governmental functions even when the conduct is negligent.
• Discretionary or quasi-judicial acts involve the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results, whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result.
• The governmental function immunity defense precludes liability for a mere error of judgment but it is not available unless the municipality establishes that the action taken actually resulted from discretionary decision-making.
• Moreover, such immunity presupposes that judgment and discretion are exercised in compliance with the municipality’s procedures, because the very basis for the value judgment supporting immunity and denying individual recovery becomes irrelevant where the municipality violates its own internal rules and policies, and exercises no judgment or discretion.
• The governmental function immunity defense is based on sound reasons of public policy in allowing government officials to execute their duties free from fear of vindictive or retaliatory damage suits.
• When both the special duty requirement and the governmental function immunity defense are asserted in a negligence case, the rule that emerges is that government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general.
• In other words, in a negligence action where the municipality has raised the governmental function immunity defense, a plaintiff may only hold the municipality liable for actions taken in its governmental capacity where (1) a special duty exists and (2) the municipality’s actions were ministerial in nature and not the result of discretionary decision-making.
• As a threshold matter, it is well established that a municipal emergency response system is a classic governmental, rather than proprietary, function.
• The Supreme Court therefore properly determined, and the parties do not dispute, that the defendants’ employees were engaged in governmental functions at all relevant times.
• Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, however, the defendants met their prima facie burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
• The defendants demonstrated that the 911 dispatcher’s decision, among other things, to send a BLS ambulance rather than an ALS ambulance was discretionary and, therefore, protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
• Under the circumstances presented, the defendants also established that the EMTs exercised their discretion in declining to immediately transport Walker-Rodriguez to the nearby hospital and to instead wait for the paramedics in the ALS ambulance to arrive.
• Similarly, the defendants demonstrated that the actions of the paramedics resulted from discretionary decision-making, including with regard to the type of treatment to render.
• Because the actions of the defendants’ employees were discretionary, this Court need not address the issue of whether a special duty was owed to the plaintiffs.
• Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Here is a copy of the decision: