Ninth Circuit Upholds Firing of Stockton Fire Chief in 2011

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the City of Stockton fired former Fire Chief Ronald Hittle in 2011 for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, and that the chief was unable to show these reasons were pretextual excuses to justify religious discrimination. In doing so the court upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the city, the former city manager Robert Deis and the former deputy city manager Laurie Montes in 2022.

The factual allegations are lengthy, and were covered in a post here in Fire Law Blog in 2012. Among the most important allegations are that the city received complaints about the chief’s religious activities, attendance at a Christian leadership conference on department time, and his alleged favoritism toward personnel who were part of a “church clique.” An outside investigator was hired and a 250-page report sustained a number of allegations, leading to Chief Hittle’s removal.

The chief claims his termination violated Title VII and California state employment discrimination law. After of years of legal wranglings, summary judgment was granted to the city and its managers on March 1, 2022, prompting the appeal.

The Ninth Circuit analyzed Chief Hittle’s allegations under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, as well as the less common theory that relies upon direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Quoting from the decision:

• We analyze employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the California FEHA using the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting test.
• Under this framework, a plaintiff alleging that an employer engaged in discriminatory conduct adversely affecting plaintiff’s employment must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.”
• Alternatively, a plaintiff can prevail merely by showing direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination; he or she does not need to use the McDonnell Douglas framework.
• Under Title VII, the plaintiff need only “demonstrate that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the [unlawful employment] practice.”
• Thus, Hittle must demonstrate that his religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his federal claims, and that his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” for his firing with respect to his FEHA claims.
• We have concluded that derogatory comments made by a decisionmaker are “direct evidence of… discriminatory animus” and “can create an inference of discriminatory motive.”
• Chief among Hittle’s examples of direct evidence of discriminatory animus is Montes’s reference to Hittle being part of a “Christian coalition,” and Montes’s and Deis’s statements that Hittle was part of a “church clique” in the Fire Department.
• Montes responds to this characterization by noting that a high-ranking Fire Department manager had complained to her that there was a “Christian coalition” within the Fire Department, and that Hittle improperly favored members of that so-called coalition. Hittle acknowledged that the term “Christian coalition” came from the anonymous letters sent to the City criticizing Hittle’s management of the Fire Department, and not from Montes herself.
• Montes’s comments—whether taken in the context of one conversation with Hittle or during Hittle’s tenure as Fire Chief as a whole—do not constitute discriminatory animus.
• Montes’s repetition of other persons’ use of pejorative terms does not provide evidence of Montes’s own animus, but rather shows concerns about other persons’ perceptions.
• And although Hittle suggests that Montes engaged in discrimination by informing him that the City was not “permitted to further religious activities” or “favor one religion over another,” these observations do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Rather, they reflect Montes’s legitimate concern that the City could violate constitutional prohibitions and face liability if it is seen to engage in favoritism with certain employees because they happen to be members of a particular religion.
• Hittle contends that Deis’s declaration in support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment contains statements that are proof of Deis’s animus towards Hittle’s religion.
• Deis describes Hittle’s attendance at the Summit as exercising “poor judgment,” and that Hittle engaged in an “inappropriate activity” that was simply “for [Hittle’s] own personal interests.” But, as discussed above, Deis, like Montes, had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to be critical of Hittle inappropriately using City resources to attend an event for his personal benefit, and inviting other City personnel to do the same.
• Nothing in our case law compels a different result,
• Finally, because neither Montes nor Deis made any remarks demonstrating their own hostility to religion, but focused on the Summit’s lack of benefit to the City and other evidence of Hittle’s misconduct, Hittle failed to demonstrate that hostility to religion was even a motivating factor in his termination.
• Hittle alleges that on the day he received the notice of investigation from the City, he met with Deis, who angrily threatened Hittle to accept a demotion or face a long, expensive legal battle in which Hittle’s reputation would suffer irreparable harm. Viewing Hittle’s account of  this meeting in the light most favorable to him still does not suggest any reasonable inference of religious animus, because there is no evidence in the record that Hittle’s religion was discussed during this meeting.
• Simply put, the summary judgment record does not contain evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact sufficient for Hittle to meet his burden to demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for firing him were mere pretext for religious discrimination.
• To summarize, we hold that, based on the record before us, the district court’s granting of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was appropriate where Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Hittle were, in sum, sufficient to rebut Hittle’s evidence of discrimination, and Hittle has failed to persuasively argue that these non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Here is a copy of the decision: