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Cyberbullying – The Ugly Side of Social Media

We have all seen the comical photos of Walmart shoppers in various modes of dress and undress. One performer has even made several humorous music videos depicting the weirdos and crazies.

Facebook itself had its origins by showing photos of college students and allowing people to rate them as “hot or not”. It’s all in good fun, right? No harm, no foul.

So what is going on in Emmitsburg, Maryland, home of the US Fire Administration and the National Fire Academy, where a mother has declared war on cyberbullying after a firefighter posted photos of her daughter on line accompanied by unflattering comments.

Sherry Myers is furious about photos of her daughter Jayden that were posted online by a Pennsylvania firefighter that mocks her shoes, and asks people to guess whether Jayden is a boy or a girl.

It’s the other side of the laughter… the painful side… the ugly side of social media.

Here is a link to Sherry’s Facebook page, which she has aptly named Justice for Jayden. Spend some time there and read some of the comments from those who have been hurt by cyberbullies.

Here is more on the story itself.

While all the facts have yet to be sorted out in the Myers case – let me make a few points about where we are law wise on cyberbullying.

Here in the US, the laws are way behind the times. While some states have enacted laws to address cyberbullying, most states rely upon tort privacy laws developed in the 1800s and 1900s. These laws did a decent job until fairly recently. Today they are being asked to address an entirely new problem… and it may be a task they are not up to.

Is it really an entirely new problem? Bullying has always been around and always will be – but when it comes to spreading hurtful information on a massive scale – I say what we are facing is an entirely new problem.

In the late 1800s, how would one go about spreading embarrassing rumors, malicious falsehoods, or even breach a person’s right to privacy on a massive scale? The options were pretty limited and usually required large sums of money to take out newspaper ads, or influence reporters and editors in order to spread a story very far. The spreading of the story would be relatively slow compared with today – and the courts did offer some remedies that could address those mean spirited activities. Newspapers also had to be concerned about such suits and thus had an incentive to do some self-policing of what was published.

The 1900s brought us new means of mass communications through radio and later television. Still these methods of communication were beyond the financial means of most people and the law offered realistic remedies to address any wrongdoing that did occur. Like the newspapers, radio and television stations themselves had good reason to watch what was said out of fear of becoming the target of such a suit.

But what about spreading malicious information in the Internet Age – where virtually anyone can communicate with thousands, even millions, for free and virtually instantly? What about the fact that people who have no financial footprint to speak of can spread malicious information to an unprecedented degree with little to no risk of legal consequences? No self-policing… they are judgment-proof… or close enough to make the cost of a civil suit unrealistic for most people.

How exactly does the law – developed originally to address problems back in the Pony Express days, give Sherry and Jayden Myers some measure of comfort, some justice?

And just as importantly, how do we, as members of the Internet community, draw our own lines about what is and is not fair game when it comes to humor, satire and parody?

The two issues are linked… or at least they should be.

Can we protect Jayden and still have our funny Walmart photos? Is there a line that can be drawn that makes one OK and the other not?

The law should reflect the ethical choices we as a society believe in.

Posted in Ethics, First Amendment, Humor, Municipal Liability, Social Media, You Can't Make This Stuff Up

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Video Recording on EMS Units

Today’s burning question:  My fire department is installing video cameras on each ambulance, covering both inside the cab and box, and outside as well. Is this is legal? I think the administration is merely trying to spy on us and I also wonder about patient confidentiality.

Answer: Interesting question and one that police departments confronted years ago. Let me start off by saying that cameras have caught more than a few police officers doing bad things. In the big picture, is that a good thing or bad thing? I think we’d all agree that it is a good thing. So wouldn’t we be a bit hypocritical to use a different set of standards when it comes to ourselves?

Perhaps the bigger point to consider with regard to law enforcement and videos is – as much as cameras have captured some police officers acting improperly – they have caught way more bad guys acting improperly… including many who try lie about it and accuse the officers of misconduct. By far, most police officers now believe in dash cams and most can recite story after story where officers have been exonerated from allegations of wrongdoing by virtue of video surveillance.

But your question was not about whether video cameras were a good idea or bad idea… right? Your question was about the “legality” of video surveillance.

There are a number of issues that can arise when an employer decides to use video surveillance in the workplace. Arguably it is a change in working conditions that in a union environment must be negotiated. Some states (Connecticut) require advanced written notice to employees before an employer can engage in any form of electronic surveillance in the workplace.

In an EMS environment there are also patient privacy and medical confidentiality issues. Confidentiality issues can be addressed by ensuring that videos are properly secured and that personnel do not violate confidentiality by improperly accesses, viewing or disseminating them. In most respects managing the videos would be no different than how we manage patient information in our run reports.

The bigger legal question is privacy. In this regard states differ tremendously.

There are two sets of concerns: audio and video.

In regards to audio, it is illegal for someone to secretly record a conversation they are not a party to. This principle holds true in all 50 states.

While employees can be required in advance to consent to audio recording as a condition of employment (assuming any collective bargaining hurtles are successfully cleared), the same cannot be required of patients and third parties. Therefore, to the extent that the video cameras record audio and capture conversations between parties who have not consented, the recordings may violate state law. Most states require the consent of at least one party to a conversation for it to be recorded, and 12 states require the consent of all parties.  The consent issue can be addressed in most states by placing warning signs cautioning others that they are being recorded – but it needs to be thoroughly researched on a state level… and it is not a perfect solution.

In regards to recording video, there are a number of states that prohibit the use of cameras in certain areas. Some states limit photo and/or video recording in areas such as bathrooms, changing rooms, locker rooms, bedrooms, and patient treatment areas. Other states refer to any location where people have an “expectation of privacy”. The back of an ambulance could be one such place where a patient believes he/she has an expectation of privacy. Again, it is important to know your state laws.

In terms of a overcoming a patient’s expectation of privacy in the back of an ambulance, that can be addressed through the proper placement of signs, similar to the way we would address audio recording.  However, with regard to signs there remains the issue of language barriers, folks who cannot read, and the blind…. Lots to think about!

So the bottom line is – there are a few legal issues that need to be addressed in order to put video cameras on EMS units.  Using cameras that record both audio and video raises a few more issues than cameras that record video only, but in either event it is probably doable in most jurisdictions if done right.

Posted in Apparatus, Burning Question, Confidentiality, Constitutional Rights, EMS

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Long Awaited Text Messaging Privacy Decision: City of Ontario v. Quon

Today the US Supreme Court handed down a long awaited decision in the case of City of Ontario v. Quon, addressing an employee’s right to privacy in electronic messages. While the case involved a police officer, the decision has important ramifications for all public employees, including firefighters.

Sergeant Jeff Quon was a SWAT officer for the City of Ontario Police Department. He was issued an Arch Wireless two way pager by the department, capable of sending and receiving text messages. The City had a written policy addressing use of the department computer system and emails that reserved “the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” However, the policy did not mention pagers or text messages.

Quon was told that the pagers and text messages would be treated like emails under the policy, and that police officers could use up to the monthly allotment of characters for messaging purposes. When Quon went over his monthly allotment, Lt. Duke, the officer responsible for the pagers informed him that he needed to pay the overage or else the department would have to examine the text messages to determine if they were work related or personal. Lt. Duke told Quon that as long as he paid the overages, no one would look at the messages. Quon paid the overage.

When the overages continued in subsequent months, Lt. Duke complained to the chief who ordered an investigation to determine whether the monthly allocation was adequate. As part of the investigation, Arch Wireless provided the department with copies of the text messages. At that point it became apparent that Quon had been sending sexually explicit messages to female coworkers, including his wife (a police officer) and another employee (dispatcher) with whom he was romantically involved. An internal affairs investigation was then initiated.

In the mean time, Quon, his wife and the female coworker sued Arch Wireless and the City of Ontario alleging that their privacy rights had been violated. The district court dismissed Arch Wireless from the suit, but concluded that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding that Lt. Duke’s statement that the Department would not review the text messages provided Quon voluntarily paid any overage charges, created a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The US Supreme Court disagreed. Recognizing the importance of the case, as well as the challenge posed by emerging technologies – the Court said:

The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. See id., at 360–361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication devices.  Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior… At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will evolve…

 Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.

A broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this case on narrower grounds. For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to him by the City; second, petitioners’ review of the transcript constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and third, the principles applicable to a government employer’s search of an employee’s physical office apply with at least the same force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic sphere.

The Court went on to hold:

Under the approach of the O’Connor plurality, when conducted for a “non investigatory, work-related purpos[e]”or for the “investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct,” a government employer’s warrantless search is reasonable if it is “‘justified at its inception’” and if “‘the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of’” the circumstances giving rise to the search. 480 U. S., at 725– 726. The search here satisfied the standard of the O’Connor plurality and was reasonable under that approach.

The search was justified at its inception because there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search [was] necessary for a non investigatory work-related purpose.” Id., at 726. As a jury found, Chief Scharf ordered the search in order to determine whether the character limit on the City’s contract with Arch Wireless was sufficient to meet the City’s needs. This was, as the Ninth Circuit noted, a “legitimate work-related rationale.” 529 F. 3d, at 908. The City and OPD had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand that the City was not paying for extensive personal communications.

As for the scope of the search, reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon’s overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use. The review was also not “‘excessively intrusive.’” O’Connor, supra, at 726 (plurality opinion). Although Quon had gone over his monthly allotment a number of times, OPD requested transcripts for only the months of August and September 2002. While it may have been reasonable as well for OPD to review transcripts of all the months in which Quon exceeded his allowance, it was certainly reasonable for OPD to review messages for just two months in order to obtain a large enough sample to decide whether the character limits were efficacious. And it is worth noting that during his internal affairs investigation, McMahon redacted all messages Quon sent while off duty, a measure which reduced the intrusiveness of any further review of the transcripts.

Furthermore, and again on the assumption that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his messages, the extent of an expectation is relevant to assessing whether the search was too intrusive. See Von Raab, supra, at 671; cf. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 654–657 (1995). Even if he could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny. Quon was told that his messages were subject to auditing. As a law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail an analysis of his on-the-job communications. Under the circumstances, a reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used. Given that the City issued the pagers to Quon and other SWAT Team members in order to help them more quickly respond to crises—and given that Quon had received no assurances of privacy—Quon could have anticipated that it might be necessary for the City to audit pager messages to assess the SWAT Team’s performance in particular emergency situations.

From OPD’s perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life. OPD’s audit of messages on Quon’s employer-provided pager was not nearly as intrusive as a search of his personal e-mail account or pager, or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have been. That the search did reveal intimate details of Quon’s life does not make it unreasonable, for under the circumstances a reasonable employer would not expect that such a review would intrude on such matters. The search was permissible in its scope.

Thus, the Court concluded that Sergeant Quon’s 4th Amendment privacy rights were not violated by the department’s actions.

How does the decision impact fire departments? All fire and emergency service organizations should have a comprehensive written policy that addresses computer and email usage, as well as voice messaging, digital messaging, text messaging, and various other forms of electronic data. This case could just as easily have involved a stored voicemail on a department issued cellphone, a voice message on an office answering system, or a text message sent via a mobile data terminal on a piece of fire apparatus. The policy should specify the extent to which an employee can expect his/her privacy to be respected when using any of these mediums, or in the alternative, clearly state that the department reserves the right to examine, copy, forward, store, save and share with third parties any and all such information.

Another important consideration is the purpose of the search. In Quon, the search was conducted for a legitimate, non-investigatory business related purpose, namely: to determine whether the monthly pager messaging allotment was adequate. Had the search been conducted for purposes of finding criminal activity by the employee, or even for internal disciplinary purposes, the analysis of the court would have been different.

Here is a copy of the decision. Download Ontario v Quon SCT

Posted in Civil Suit, Constitutional Rights, Disciplinary Action, Evidence, Search and Seizure, Web/Tech

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Electronic Monitoring Case: Connecticut

A very interesting case was decided on January 5, 2010 involving the Bridgeport, Connecticut Fire Department. In May of 2007, the city acquired new vehicles for city fire inspectors, and installed GPS devices in order to electronically monitor the movement and location of the vehicles while they were in use. The city monitored the inspectors’ activities using the GPS devices and brought disciplinary actions against inspectors Frank Gerardi and Stephen Vitka.

Gerardi and Vitka filed suit against the city alleging it had violated Connecticut General Statutes § 31-48d which prohibits employers from electronically monitoring employees without prior notice to the employee. They sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief and damages.

(more…)

Posted in Civil Suit, Disciplinary Action, Evidence

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Firefighter and ACLU Sue Town for Privacy Violation

On December 4, 2009, the RI affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of a Johnston firefighter against the town and its police chief, alleging that the release of the  firefighter's driver's license information to a town councilman, and its subsequent release to the public, violated the Federal  Drivers Privacy Protection Act.

The suit names the town and Police Chief Richard Tamburini as defendants. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act prohibits the disclosure of motor vehicle record information by police and others for unauthorized purposes. The councilman, Ernest Pitochelli, released a letter into a local newspaper that was critical of the Johnston Fire Department, cited the firefighter’s vehicle as having an offensive bumper sticker, identified the firefighter by name, and stated he was on work-related disability. The day after the letter was published, the windshield of the firefighter’s car was smashed.

More on the story.

Posted in Civil Suit, Confidentiality, Municipal Liability

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