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Hurricane Evacuation Orders and Liability

Today’s burning question: If someone refuses to follow an evacuation order made because a hurricane is approaching, can we be liable if we later refuse to respond to their distress calls in the middle of the storm because they changed their minds?

Answer: Probably not. I would like to say categorically no, but it is possible an unusual case could arise if responders do not act in good faith. Short of bad faith, gross negligence, or recklessness, it is unlikely that responders could be held liable for not responding during a hurricane. Let’s look at the issues in more detail.

The first challenge that a non-evacuee would have in suing responders would be to prove that the responders were somehow negligent for not responding. In other words, the non-evacuees would have to prove the reasonably prudent emergency responders have responded under the circumstances. The non-evacuees are not likely to win there because the reasonably prudent responder would not respond during the middle of a hurricane.

The second challenge the non-evacuees would have to prove is that the emergency responders have a legal duty to respond. Even in the absence of a declared emergency, many jurisdictions adopt what is known as the public duty doctrine which holds that public entities do not owe a legal duty to the general public, be it to respond to fires, emergencies, or deliver other types of governmental services. There are of course exceptions (most notably when a “special duty” is created – but that would not be the case here) and not all states adopt the public duty doctrine.

Even if the non-evacuees got by those hurtles, there would be the challenge of sovereign immunity and statutory immunity protection that many emergency responders have.

But let’s assume that a non-evacuee got past all of those liability hurtles. Is there any other protection that emergency responders have to protect them in such a situation?

As a matter of fact there is, and it would be the proverbial “ace in the hole”. States have adopted emergency management acts that give state and local officials extra powers in times of emergencies. These acts usually go into effect when the governor declares a state of emergency. Among the things that happen when a governor declares a state of emergency is that immunity protection is applied in a blanket manner to all responders.

Take a look at Rhode Island’s law:

RIGL  § 30-15-15  Immunity from liability – (a) All functions under this chapter and all other activities relating to disaster response are hereby declared to be governmental functions. Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof nor other agencies of the state or political subdivision thereof, nor, except in cases in willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith, any disaster response worker complying with or reasonably attempting to comply with this chapter, or any order, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or pursuant to any ordinance relating to precautionary measures enacted by any political subdivision of the state, shall be liable for the death of or injury to persons, or for damage to property, as a result of disaster response activity.

Immunity protection under such emergency conditions makes alot of sense. Decisions have to be made in disaster situations: who will be saved, who cannot be saved, who will get critical limited resources and who will not. Laws such as RIGL  § 30-15-15  provide a clear level of liability protection for emergency managers and responders alike to make those necessary decisions without fear of liability.

Supplementing state emergency management laws are another set of laws enacted by all fifty states called the Emergency Management Assistance Compact or EMAC. EMAC is essentially a state to state mutual aid agreement for disasters. EMAC also provides for immunity protection for responders and state and local officials:

§ 30-15.9-6  Liability. – officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes; and no party state or its officers or employees rendering aid in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged or on account of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith. Good faith in this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence or recklessness.

When you consider the liability protection afforded to state and local officials in a declared emergency, rest assured you are on solid legal ground to tell folks who are contemplating staying in place despite an evacuation order: You need to leave now and if you choose not to, we will not come back in the middle of the storm if you change your mind.

For the legal eagles out there, there are a few other defenses….

  1. Lack of proximate cause (the proximate cause for their injuries was the storm and/or their decision not to evacuate)
  2. Contributory negligence
  3. Assumption of the risk

Can you think of any others?

Posted in Burning Question, Duty to Act, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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Pennsylvania Fire Chief Settles Defamation Suit

A defamation suit filed against Wilkes-Barre Township Fire Chief John Yuknavich for statements he had at a council meeting in 2009 has been settled.

Joseph Naperkowski claimed that Chief Yuknavich defamed him on June 1, 2009. He claims that Chief Yuknavich told others that Naperkowski said “I’ll kill you, I’ll kill your mother, I’ll kill your family and I’ll even kill the mayor if he don’t straighten you out.” Naperkowski filed suit seeking $50,000 in damages alleging the statements were “false and defamatory”.

Chief Yuknavich  contended that Naperowski’s claim should be barred because it was made during a public meeting and as fire chief he is immune from the lawsuit. A jury trial began earlier this week but was abruptly terminated yesterday when the parties reached a settlement. There is no word on the terms of the settlement.

More on the story.

As for Chief Yuknavich’s immunity defense, most jurisdictions recognize a number of absolute and qualified privileges against claims of defamation.  Legislators enjoy absolutely immunity for statements made during their sessions. The exact scope of that immunity varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it is generally limited to the legislators, not fire chiefs or department heads.

However, many jurisdictions recognize a privilege for executives.  Here is a brief summary from the Center for First Amendment Studies:

There is also an absolute privilege afforded to top rank, “cabinet” or department head level, or other top-level policy-making officials in the executive branches of government, both federal and state. The privilege can be lost, however, if, as in the courts, the statements have no reasonable relevancy to the public official’s duties or the scope of his office.

Here is the link to the Center’s web site.

Posted in Civil Suit, First Amendment, Immunity

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City Fire Chief Sues County for Fireground Injuries

The fire chief of Patterson, New Jersey has filed suit against Passaic County claiming the county is responsible for the injuries he sustained at a fire in 2011.

Fire Chief Michael Postorino was injured on February 18, 2011, while battling a major fire that damaged four buildings. He reportedly stepped into a hole in a county owned road and was seriously injured. He claims that the fall caused permanent injuries resulting in him having to expend “large sums of money for medical care and attention”.

The suit was filed on Monday in Superior Court for Passaic County. It alleges that the county was on notice of the hole in the road, and negligently failed to address the risk.

More on the story.

Still working on getting a copy of the complaint.

Posted in Civil Suit, Duty to Act, Firemen's Rule, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Workers Compensation

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NJ Supreme Court Rules Against Rescue Squad Immunity

On Tuesday, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down a decision paving the way for a jury to decide whether personnel assigned to the Plainfield Rescue Squad were negligent in not immediately transporting a shooting victim, as opposed to performing CPR for 30 minutes on scene.

Here are the facts in the court’s own words:

Shortly after 5:00 a.m. on August 4, 2004, twenty-five-year-old Odis P. Murray was shot in the chest by his younger brother outside their home at 418 Parkside Road in Plainfield. Their parents, Geraldine and Odis E. Murray, who were already awake, were alerted by “loud noises” and went outside to investigate. They found their son, Odis, lying in the street behind his car with a gunshot wound in his chest. He was conscious and able to speak and identified his brother as the shooter. Mrs. Murray—a critical-care nurse by profession—immediately returned to her home and called 9–1–1. The time was approximately 5:12 a.m. Three minutes later, a Plainfield police officer appeared on the scene. At 5:16 a.m., a Plainfield Rescue Squad (Rescue Squad or Squad) ambulance—staffed by two Emergency Medical Technicians-basics (EMT-basics) and one volunteer in-training—arrived. A mobile intensive care unit, known as Mercy 9, was dispatched from defendant John F. Kennedy Medical Center in Edison at 5:13 a.m.1 Mr. and Mrs. Murray averred in certifications and deposition testimony that Mercy 9 never came to the scene.

Given their status as EMT-basics, the two Rescue Squad members had authority, among other things, to assess vital signs; administer oxygen; manage cardiac, respiratory, and diabetic shock emergencies; perform pulmonary and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR); and provide emergency treatment for bleeding and “chest-abdominal-pelvic injuries.”…

According to the Squad members, the patient did not have a pulse and was “unconscious and not responding to verbal stimuli or painful stimuli.” They began giving him CPR and oxygen through “a bag valve mask,” and then “hooked him to a defibrillator,” which registered “ ‘no shock advised.’ “ They then continued performing CPR and ventilation. During this process, Mrs. Murray asked the Squad members why they were not transporting her son to the hospital or intubating him—that is, placing a tube down his larynx to secure an airway. When Mrs. Murray asked those questions, in her opinion, the Squad members “looked at [her] like a deer in headlights.” Muhlenberg Regional Medical Center—the nearest hospital—was only minutes away.

Approximately fifteen minutes after their arrival, the Squad members called for a Medevac helicopter to transport the patient to a hospital. That request was canceled because protocol did not allow for such a transport when a patient is in cardiac arrest. Eventually, Odis—who weighed between 260 and 270 pounds—was secured on a board and placed in the ambulance. Not until 5:47 a.m.—more than thirty minutes after first appearing at the scene—did the Rescue Squad members take the patient to Muhlenberg hospital. On their arrival there, hospital personnel intubated the patient and attempted to insert an intravenous line. Odis, still alive, had an active blood pressure. The bullet had perforated his aorta and severed his spinal cord. By 6:10 a.m., he was pronounced dead. The autopsy report declared the cause of death as “[p]enetrating gunshot wound to the chest.”

The Murrays retained as an expert Assistant Burlington County Medical Examiner Dr. William L. Manion, who expressed the following opinions in his report. The Rescue Squad members “wasted over 30 minutes at the scene” while performing ineffective CPR, thus depriving the patient of “any chance of surviving his injury.” He needed an immediate transport “to Muhlenberg Regional Medical Center Emergency Room where a surgical trauma team could have opened his chest, stopped blood loss and taken him to the [operating room] for surgical repair.” Although “mortality from injuries to the thoracic aorta is high,” despite the “tremendous delay in transporting” Odis to the hospital, he still “demonstrated a blood pressure of 66/47 and EKG activity in the emergency room.” “Had [the patient] been transported promptly he would have had a high degree of probability of surviving the bullet injury.”4 “He essentially died without the benefit of surgical and emergency services provided by a professional trauma center only two minutes away.” Dr. Manion concluded that the members of the Squad engaged in “significant deviations from usual standards of rescue squad practice [that] were significant contributing factors to [Odis's] death.”…

Plaintiffs Geraldine and Odis E. Murray … filed a wrongful-death/survival action against defendants Plainfield Rescue Squad and John F. Kennedy Medical Center, claiming that defendants’ negligence proximately caused the death of their son. The complaint alleged that the Rescue Squad’s members failed both to provide critical emergency-medical treatments to Odis and to transport him promptly to Muhlenberg Regional Medical Center for life-saving medical intervention. The complaint also alleged that the Mercy 9 paramedics operating out of JFK Medical Center never arrived at the scene or, alternatively, if they did, failed to take necessary life-saving measures, such as starting an intravenous line, intubating the patient, monitoring the patient’s cardiac condition, and giving emergency medications. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages against defendants….

The suit did not name any of the individual members of the rescue squad or Mercy 9, but instead sought to hold the rescue squad and the hospital liable for the actions of their employees. The trial court ruled that the hospital had statutory immunity, and that the rescue squad was similarly immune plus had protection under the state’s Good Samaritan Act.

The plaintiffs appealed initially to the Appellate Division of New Jersey Superior Court, where the Good Samaritan Act was found not to apply to an emergency to which a rescue squad was dispatched. However, the squad was held to be immune under N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29.  The Plaintiffs appealed that ruling and the issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was a limited one: whether the rescue squad had statutory immunity under N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29.

N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29 states:

“[n]o EMT-intermediate, licensed physician, hospital or its board of trustees, officers and members of the medical staff, nurses or other employees of the hospital, or officers and members of a first aid, ambulance or rescue squad shall be liable for any civil damages as the result of an act or the omission of an act committed while in training for or in the rendering of intermediate life support services in good faith and in accordance with this act.”

In deciding the case, the NJ Supreme Court concluded that N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29 provides immunity protection to individual members but not to the emergency organization for which the individual members work. The court was quite blunt in its reasoning: “The Legislature knows how to write an immunity statute covering both an entity and its individual members.”

The court rejected the logic that “ if a Squad member is not liable under the immunity provision of N.J.S.A. 26:2K–29, then the Squad cannot be liable”, pointing to other immunity statutes that grant protection to both individual members and the organization.

“The Legislature chose to provide immunity to volunteer rescue squads, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A–13.1, and to rescue squads rendering advanced life support services, N.J.S.A. 26:2K–14. By the clear language of N.J.S.A . 26:2K–29, the Legislature chose not to provide immunity to rescue squads, as entities, rendering intermediate life support services. If the failure to provide immunity to such rescue squads was an oversight, any corrective measure must be taken by the Legislature.” It should be pointed out that the Plainfield Rescue Squad was not a volunteer rescue squad, nor was it an ALS unit. This it could not take advantage of the immunity protection afforded to either of those entities.

Here is a copy of the decision. Murray v Plainfield Rescue Squad

The big take away from this case is that the court did not find the EMTs to be negligent, nor the Plainfield Rescue Squad to have been liable. Rather, the court concluded that the Murrays have the right to have their case heard by a jury.

News coverage of the decision.

Posted in Civil Suit, Duty to Act, EMS, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Wrongful death

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Baltimore Settles Fatal Accident Case from 2007

Today, the City of Baltimore settled a wrongful death suit brought by the estates of three people killed in a SUV that collided with a ladder truck in 2007.

The accident occurred at 3:00 am on December 9, 2007, when Ladder 27 was responding to a report of smoke in an apartment building. It collided with an SUV killing Iryna Petrov, 49, her husband, Mikhail Petrov, 35, and Igor Saub, 24, and injuring all four of the firefighters aboard.

Investigators concluded the ladder was traveling at 47 mph at the time, while the SUV was traveling at 23 mph. The fire turned out to be food on the stove. No criminal charges were filed against the driver of the ladder.

The case was settled for the modest sum of $40,000. Alex Poberesky, attorney for the plaintiffs, said concerns about strong immunity protection afforded to firefighters and fire departments in Maryland factored into the decision.

More on the accident.

More on the settlement.

Posted in Apparatus, Civil Suit, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Wrongful death

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Controversial NY LODD Case Settles

It appears that a settlement has been reached in a controversial wrongful death lawsuit filed by the widow of an upstate New York firefighter who died at a house fire 10 years ago.

On March 7, 2002 Fayetteville firefighter Timothy Lynch, 28, and Manlius firefighter John Ginocchetti, 41, died when a floor collapsed at a house fire. Lynch’s widow, Donna Prince Lynch, filed suit against the property owner, Onondaga County, and the fire departments involved. She accused the county and fire departments of mismanaging the incident, and allowing unsafe operations that caused the death.

The case garnered considerable attention as it wound its way through the New York state court system. One series of headlines were prompted by a decision that the failure to comply with NIMS ICS can serve as a basis for liability under NY General Municipal Law § 205-a. That statute provides NY firefighters who are injured in the line of duty with a right to sue those who violate a law or legal requirement. § 205-a states:

“ …in the event any accident, causing injury, death or a disease which results in death, occurs directly or indirectly as  a  result  of  any  neglect, omission,  willful  or  culpable  negligence of any person or persons in failing to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  any  of  the  statutes,  ordinances,  rules,  orders  and  requirements  of  the  federal, state, county, village, town or city governments or of any  and  all  their departments, divisions and bureaus, the person or persons guilty of said neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence at the time of such injury or death shall be liable to pay any  officer,  member,  agent  or   employee of any fire department injured…”

The case later generated even more headlines when an appellate court ruled that a state law granting immunity to protection to firefighters does not protect fire departments or high ranking fire department officials. As such, the suit against the departments and a number of command level officers could continue.

The settlement is reported to be $1.2 million, with Onondaga County contributing $863,000, and the Manlius and Pompey Hill fire departments paying the remaining $337,000. The settlement must be approved by the county’s legislative body.

More on the story.

Posted in Civil Suit, Immunity, LODD, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Occupational Safety & Health, Wrongful death

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Ohio Fatal Accident Case Raises Some Important Policy Questions

There is a case pending before the Ohio Supreme Court that raises some important considerations for fire departments, and in particular questions about a department’s policy for emergency response driving.

The case arose out of an apparatus accident in Canton, Ohio on July 4, 2007. FF James Coombs was responding to a house fire when the apparatus he was driving struck a vehicle in an intersection and killed the two occupants, Grace and Dale Burlingame.

At the time the apparatus’s siren was not functioning and the unit was responding with lights and sounding its air horn. According to court papers, the apparatus had a red traffic signal and proceeded through the intersection broadsiding the Burlingame vehicle at approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour. The estates of the deceased sued the City of Canton and FF Coombs.

At trial the court granted a summary judgment in favor of the fire department and the driver concluding both were entitled to immunity under Ohio law because at worst FF Coombs was guilty of negligence.  On appeal the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed finding that “reasonable minds could differ” over whether FF Coombs’ driving was “willful, wanton or reckless”, in which case he would not be entitled to immunity protection.

The Court of Appeals decision does an excellent job of explaining negligence, and distinguishing negligence from willful, wanton and reckless conduct.  At issue in the case is whether FF Coombs should have discontinued emergency response due to the loss of the siren, come to a complete stop at the red light, and whether his failure to do so arose to the level of “willful, wanton or reckless” behavior.

Also at issue before the Ohio Supreme Court will be the relevance of the Canton Fire Department’s internal policies and procedures to a determination of the standard of care, as well as the impact of state laws that require fire apparatus to slow down before proceeding through intersections. The trial court ruled that policies and state laws were not relevant to a determination of FF Coombs’ conduct. The Court of Appeals disagreed.

Among the key quotes:

  • Violation of departmental policy or of traffic laws may be a factor for the jury to consider in determining whether the conduct of the defendants rose to the level of wanton or reckless.
  • The laws and policies are designed to make emergency responses safer for the public. However, they also exist for the protection of the firefighters, who already face serious personal risks in their day-to-day jobs, and who must not be further imperiled en route to their humanitarian roles. We find violations of traffic statutes and departmental policies are factors a jury may consider in determining whether Coombs’ actions were reckless.
  • [N]egligence is mere inadvertence, incompetence, lack of skill, or failure to take precautions that would allow the person to cope with a possible or probable future emergency. Reckless consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The person does not intend to cause the harm that results from it but realizes or, from known facts, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though the person hopes or even expects that the conduct will prove harmless. Intentional misconduct occurs when the person intends to cause harm.

This case is important because of a possible implication that some may draw from it. Some may interpret this case as calling into question the wisdom of having written policies if they can be used as a basis to find a firefighter and fire department liable. Do not fall for that trap.

One of the goals of having formal policies is to reduce liability – but not through some sort of magical legal hocus pocus (ie changing the name of SOPs to SOGs). That is nothing more than rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic. The goal of having policies is to reduce the likelihood that an event such as a fatal apparatus accident is going to occur. Good, sound policies supplemented by training and enforced by officers who are unafraid of demonstrating leadership can prevent these types of accidents from occurring. That has to be our goal.

Misunderstanding this case as a call to eliminate or dilute written policies will make these kinds of tragedies more likely, not less likely.

The case was argued before the Ohio Supreme Court on Tuesday.

Here is the Court of Appeals decision. 2011-ohio-1325

More on the story.

Posted in Apparatus, Civil Suit, Evidence, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Occupational Safety & Health, Wrongful death

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North Carolina EMT Has No Immunity Protection for Chapel Hill Death

A ruling this week in North Carolina has left an EMT without immunity protection in a suit by the family of a high school football player who died after practice in 2008.

Atlas Fraley, 17, died from complications related to dehydration and severe muscle cramps. Following football practice at Chapel Hill High School on August 12, 2008, he went home, felt ill, and called 911. EMT James Griffin from Orange County Emergency Services responded and concluded that Fraley’s condition did not warrant further treatment or transport.

Despite Fraley’s age, Griffin did not transport him, nor contact his parents to obtain a refusal. The age of consent in North Carolina is 18. Griffin gave Farley some instructions on how to relieve the symptoms and told him to call 911 if the symptoms did not improve.

When Fraley’s parents returned home, Atlas was not breathing, and was pronounced dead by responding EMS personnel. Griffin was subsequently suspended, and chose to resign in lieu of termination.

Atlas’s parents filed suit against Griffin, Orange County Emergency Services, and Orange County for wrongful death.  Both OCES and Orange County were dismissed from the suit based on sovereign immunity.

Griffin also sought to be dismissed from the suit based upon the fact that he was acting in an official capacity, and therefore was entitled to public official immunity. The trial court denied the motion in November, 2010, and Griffin appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.

The court’s analysis focused upon whether Griffin was a public official or a public employee. As interpreted under North Carolina case law, a public official exercises discretion and has immunity for his/her decisions, while a public employee carries out ministerial tasks and is liable for his/her negligence.

The court clarified the distinction between an official and an employee by citing case law that held that a public official (1) serves in a position created by the constitution or statutes;  (2) exercises a portion of the sovereign power; and (3) exercises discretion.

Based on the 3 point test, the court concluded that an EMT such as Griffin was not a public official, but rather was a public employee, and thus could be held personally liable for his negligence.

Here is a copy of the decision. Fraley v Griffin

Griffin may appeal the decision to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

A couple of bullet points just for the sake of clarity:

  • The court did not say that Griffin was negligent, nor that he is liable. It only ruled he has to stand trial.
  • The ruling is limited to North Carolina. The vast majority of states offer some level of immunity protection to emergency responders, (usually only for negligence). Most states do not leave a publicly employed EMT personally liable for negligence while allowing the state or municipal employer completely off the hook.
  • Most states recognize a distinction between a discretionary act and a ministerial act and provide immunity protection only for discretionary acts. However, states are all over the map when it comes to what they consider to be a discretionary act. Most states do not link discretionary acts to certain positions that are designated as “public officials” for purposes of immunity – but rather find that a given employee may at times act in a discretionary manner, and at other times act in a ministerial manner.

More on the story.

Posted in Civil Suit, Duty to Act, EMS, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Wrongful death

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Fire Company Hit with Multi-Million Dollar Verdict

A New Jersey volunteer fire company that responded to a wires down incident in 2007, has been hit with a major portion of a $20.5 million verdict in favor of a man who was shocked and traumatically injured.

Last Friday, a jury found the Northside Engine Company, of Tinton Falls, to be 60 percent responsible for the injuries sustained by William Hagerman on February 15, 2007. The jury concluded that the remaining 40% share was attributable to Jersey Central Power & Light.

The incident occurred during an ice storm. The fire company was dispatched to reported wires down, and according to Hagerman’s attorney, Norman Hobbie, left the scene aware that the wires were live and in the Hagerman’s driveway.

News reports also indicate that an electric company supervisor and a police officer were on the scene when Hagerman and his wife attempted to drive out of their driveway. The car struck the wires, creating sparks that prompted Hagerman to pull back into the driveway and exit the vehicle. Unfortunately when he exited his vehicle, it was still in contact with the wires.

As a result of his injuries, Hagerman lost an arm and a leg, and suffered massive burn injuries. Oddly enough the jury did not assess any fault to Hagerman himself, nor a police officer who was on the scene. In fact, Hobbie referred to the police officer as the “hero” of the story for coming to Hagerman’s aid following his injury.

While some of what has been written about the case seems to make sense, I have to admit I am a bit baffled. First of all, was ICS used by the responding agencies and/or considered by the lawyers? The news reports don’t get into the details of what occurred – but ICS is one of those things that lawyers (non-firefighter lawyers that is) do not quite understand. If command of the incident had been duly turned over to the police and/or the electric company supervisor, why was the fire department even in the suit…. Of course if ICS was not used… or they didn’t formally pass command … well… that might explain why they were left holding the bag.

Second, how can the homeowner not bear some level of responsibility for noticing a down electrical wire in his driveway? Wouldn’t the various fire, police and electric company vehicles parked in front of his property be a tip-off that something might be up? Seriously, are people entitled to be that oblivious that it becomes totally our obligation to protect them from hazards such as electrical wires down in their own driveway? Zero % responsibility to Hagerman, himself…. Seriously? Not even 1%???

Third, if volunteer firefighters have an obligation to warn Mr. Hagerman, why wouldn’t a paid police officer have an obligation to warn Mr. Hagerman? Why would it fall 60% on the fire department (who were no longer on the scene) and 40% on the electric company, and 0% on the police? Sometimes these cases come down to the lawyering and if the right arguments are not made…. Well … you end up with a verdict that leaves you scratching your head. Then again, if a fire company really did drive away from a truly dangerous situation involving lives wires down leaving them totally unattended and someone gets seriously injured.. what would you expect to be the outcome?

Lastly – I would have expected the fire department to have been dismissed from the case based on the public duty rule, and perhaps that issue, or some form of immunity argument may still be litigated in a post-verdict motion and/or appeal. (Note a quick check failed to disclose any prior public duty rule cases in NJ…. Hint to fire company lawyer… maybe its not too late to make some new law….). Stay tuned… its not over til…. the check is in the bank.

More on the story.

Posted in Civil Suit, Duty to Act, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Volunteers, Wrongful death

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Should Firefighters Be Able To Sue?

“We live in a culture of litigation now, and I suppose the fire service isn’t any different from any others in that sense.” Interesting quote … from a former firefighter … and South Ayrshire Councillor John Allan about the settlement of a lawsuit in Scotland brought by a senior fire commander who was injured 2006.

Commander Paul Tanzilli was injured in a strange boating accident on August 9, 2006. He and a crew were evaluating the operation of a pioneer rescue boat when it hit a “freak wave” created by a nearby tug boat. Tanzilli was thrown from his seat and injured his back fracturing his L1 vertebrae.

The commander filed suit against his superiors for negligence, “claiming there was no consideration taken for ‘untrained personnel’ on board”. The £50,000 case was settled for an undisclosed amount in part because of a concern over setting a precedent that could lead to more suits if the case went to trial…. Seriously??? And exactly what message does settling the case send…

Anyway – here is a good link to the story. It is interesting to see that the US does not have a monopoly on lawsuits. While I do not know enough about the case to be able to comment in detail – one point that struck me as odd is the commentary by several people quoted in the article that suggests that because someone is a firefighter, they have accepted a level of risk and should therefore be prohibited from suing. For example:

  • “However, when I joined I knew I was putting myself at risk. You go to work every day and you don’t know how that day will end. If you are going to have to save someone or a bit of property then you will always be putting yourself at risk, and you just have to accept that.”
  • “These things happen in these services, and they happen in everyday life. It is about what is appropriate.”

I am not buying into the assumption of risk argument. As firefighters we no doubt accept a certain level of risk – but not all risk. An astronaut accepts risk. But if he is injured through the negligence of someone while he is being driven to the launch pad – he should not be prohibited from suing simply because he accepted a greater risk by agreeing to go into outer space. Again, I don’t know the specifics of the Scottish case – but accepting the risks of being a firefighter does not excuse all acts of negligence.

If the same case occurred in the US, there would be some level of liability protection offered through the workers compensation exclusivity principle. Essentially, in the US – workers compensation is considered to be the exclusive remedy for someone injured at work. An injured worker cannot sue his employer or co-workers for work related injuries except in limited circumstances. But it has nothing to do with the acceptance of a certain level of risk… If that were the case we would have librarians and accountants able to sue for injuries that firefighters could not! Interesting discussion though!!!!

 

Posted in Civil Suit, Immunity, International, Municipal Liability, Negligence, You Can't Make This Stuff Up

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DeKalb County Wrongful Death Suit Settled – Lesson Learned

A settlement has been reached in the lawsuit against DeKalb County arising out of the death of Ann Bartlett. Mrs. Bartlett died on January 24, 2010 after her oxygen device sparked a fire in her home.

Bartlett called 911 to report the fire and fire trucks responded to her house, but apparently returned in service when they saw nothing visible from the street. They returned several hours later to find the house well involved.

The suit was filed by Bartlett's family against the county and five firefighters. CBS Atlanta is reporting that the settlement was for $200,000, and includes assurances that steps have been taken to prevent a reoccurrence. CBS Atlanta is also reporting that interim DeKalb County Fire Chief Eddie O'Brien has outlined 10 specific changes the department has made in the aftermath of the debacle.

The settlement releases the county and the five individual defendants from liability, but does not admit responsibility. The ten specific changes include:

1. Updating of ICS guidelines and associated training

2. Mandatory use of ICS on all incidents

3. Battalion chiefs to verify all incidents where company officers wish to cancel additional units

4. Mandatory 360 walk around of the location of a reported fire.

5. Clarification of level 1 staging.

6. Clarification on what crews should do if an address cannot be located.

7. Improvement in tracking critical factors such as Address, Call Back Number, Information on the MDT, Location of Incident, Size Up and a 360 view.

8. Education on the Automatic Number Identification and Automatic Location Identification system.

9. Review of the training required of acting officers.

10. Improvements to GIS mapping on the Mobile Data Terminal in fire apparatus

For more information, including video coverage.

 

Posted in Civil Suit, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Wrongful death

Defamation Suit Against Fire Chief Dismissed

A defamation lawsuit filed last year by an angry property owner against a Kentucky fire department and its fire chief has been dismissed. David Young, owner of Vincent Apartments, sued the city of Ashland and Fire Chief Scott Penick over comments the chief made to a reporter following the code related condemnation of the building. Several other code officials were also named in the lawsuit.

Chief Penick made the remarks on January 6, 2010 to a reporter for the Daily Independent, concluding that the building was in a dangerous condition. Young claimed the chief’s remarks were false, malicious, defamatory, and damaged his reputation. The building was evacuated of tenants following the condemnation.

On January 4, 2011, Judge C. David Hagerman concluded that the chief’s statements were "fair comment on matters of public concern", and “clearly based upon the facts". In particular, there were missing fire extinguishers and smoke detectors, a faulty alarm system, and problems with a fire escape.

For more on the story.

 

Posted in Civil Suit, Fire Prevention, Immunity, Municipal Liability

Missouri Court Rules that “True Emergency” Required for EMTs to Claim Immunity

In a troubling decision issued on September 21, 2010, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that immunity protection for emergency responders will not protect them if they mistakenly conclude a patient is not seriously ill. The background of the case is important to understanding just how unsettling the decision is.

First off, Missouri courts recognize the concept of official immunity. The court decision explains official immunity as “a judicially-created doctrine designed to protect public employees from liability for allegedly negligent acts committed during their performance of official duties.” It is a bit different from the more common sovereign immunity and statutory immunity that applies to many fire service organizations in other states.

Second, the facts of the case: on July 10, 2008 Anthony Thomas called 911 complaining of chest pains and difficulty breathing. Community Fire Protection District dispatched an ambulance to the call. EMT Michael Brandt, and paramedic James Loehrer examined Thomas, concluded he was suffering from acid reflux, recommended an over-the-counter treatment, and left after just 15 minutes.

The next morning, Thomas called 911 again, still complaining of difficulty breathing and chest pains. This time a Community Fire Protection District ambulance staffed two different personnel responded and transported him to the DePaul Health Center, where he arrested and died.

Thomas’s children filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Brandt, Loehrer and the Community Fire Protection District alleging negligence. The suit was filed in the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, who granted summary judgment to the firefighter-defendants on the grounds of official immunity. The Thomas children appealed.

In reversing the trial court, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated “Respondents are not immune from Appellant’s wrongful death action based on official immunity. Official immunity is available to publicly-employed emergency responders only if they are acting in a true emergency situation.”

The court did not elaborate on the hair they were splitting, which leads me to believe they may have missed a very important point: A fire department ambulance responded with “lights and siren” on an emergency run, for a patient who was legitimately having a real medical emergency, yet according to the court the incident was somehow transformed into a non-emergency because personnel misdiagnosed the patient… and it was that misdiagnosis that both made the firefighters liable AND excluded them from liability protection. WOW!!!

If the court recognized the subtlety, they totally glossed over it in the decision. Here is a copy. Download ThomasDecision.jsp

The case now goes back to the trial court, unless it is appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. Perhaps the MSC will be able to square this issue away. The good news is it will have no applicability outside of Missouri.

Posted in Civil Suit, EMS, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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Michigan Appeals Court Dismisses All But One Firefighter From Personal Injury Suit

The Court of Appeals of Michigan handed down a ruling last week that dismissed a fire department and several firefighter defendants from a personal injury suit, but left one firefighter now to face a jury.

The plaintiff in the suit, John Cheek, owned a Subway sandwich franchise. On February 8, 2007, he allowed members of the Clinton Township Fire Department to use an outside water spigot as part of a training exercise being conducted nearby. The water was needed as part of a breaching and breaking drill.

Cheek alleged the firefighters carelessly left the water running,  which in February in Michigan can only result in one thing. Several hours afterwards, as Cheek was taking out the garbage he slipped on a sheet of ice, resulting in serious injuries including a broken hip.

Cheek sued the fire department, Fire Chief Michael Phy, and Firefighter Timothy Duncan, who was in charge of the drill. The suit alleged Duncan was grossly negligent in allowing the area to become iced over. Cheek later sought to add the chief of training and a battalion commander to the suit, alleging they were negligent in their supervision of Duncan. However, the trial court refused to allow either party to be added, finding that any negligence on their part would be subject to governmental immunity. The trial court also dismissed the department and the fire chief from the suit based on immunity.

On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court rulings. Here is the actual decision. Download Cheek

That leaves Duncan to face the allegations himself. Why? In Michigan as in most states, there is no protection immunity for gross negligence. Only claims of negligence are entitled to immunity.

There are some factual questions that may give Duncan the advantage at trial, including the fact that the spigot was defective (leaked), and Cheek's own negligence may have played a role is his fall.

 

Posted in Civil Suit, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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Charleston Families Argue That City Should NOT Be Kept In Lawsuit

The June 18, 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store fire is in the headlines again, this time on the civil suit side. On March 12, 2010, the South Carolina Court of Appeals refused to dismiss an appeal filed by the store owners over a trial court ruling to dismiss the city of Charleston from the case. The city was dismissed from the suit last summer because under South Carolina law it is immune from liability. The families of eight of the nine the deceased firefighters had asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal. The parties have 30 days to submit their briefs.

Why would the families want to keep the city out of the civil law suit, while at the same time seek to have the fire chief and other city officials held criminally liable for the deaths? If the city is a defendant at trial, the owners of the Sofa Super Store can ask the jury to offset any liability they may have for the damages, by the percentage amount that the jury apportions to the city. The legal principle is called comparative negligence, and it allows a jury to apportion fault on a percentage basis among those defendants found to be at fault. For example, if the jury found that the city was 50% at fault for the deaths, the damages that the Super Sofa Store would potentially have to pay could be reduced by 50%.

Out of 30 defendants in the case, 19 have already have reached settlements totaling $8.4 million to the families. Remaining in the suit are the Sofa Super Store, its owners and operators, the Goldstein Family Limited Partnership; and a few contractors.

(more…)

Posted in Civil Suit, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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Kentucky Case Upholds Immunity for Fire Departments

When it comes to the liability of fire departments, suits for negligent firefighting concern fire chiefs and firefighters the most. Making life and death decisions in a time compressed, high-stress environment with incomplete situational awareness seems like a recipe for poor decisionmaking. These circumstances that make it easy to be second guessed afterwards if things don't turn out right.

In many jurisdictions, immunity protection serves as a shield for fire departments from being second guessed (and held liable) by courts and juries. The problem is, immunity protections are constantly under attack. A recent case in Kentucky, involving the Caneyville Volunteer Fire Department, presented a constitutional challenge to the immunity protection provided to fire departments. The challenge was based on a provision in the Kentucky state constitution that gives every person who is "wronged" a right to redress through the courts.

The case is an interesting read, looking historically at both the fire service in Kentucky and immunity laws in general. The bottom line: The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld immunity protection for fire departments for operational activities at the scene of a fire.

Download CaneyvilleCaseKYSovereignImmun

Posted in Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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$3.2 Million Death Settlement in Chicago

The City of Chicago just settled a wrongful death case for $3.2 million.

The suit resulted from an incident where a Chicago engine company responded on a medical emergency, and the defibrillator did not work. The defibrillator failure that was attributed to the fact that the batteries were not replaced every 2 years as
recommended by the manufacturer. The patient died despite CPR being initiated almost immediately by his son, an off-duty firefighter.

The case raises a number of interesting issues:

  1. Could the City have been found liable at trial in the absence of proof that “but for” the dated batteries, the decedent would have survived? In legal parlance, the question is framed a bit differently – and focuses on whether the batteries were the proximate cause of the dead.
  2. Does the City have immunity for such an occurrence?
  3. Did the City owe the decedent a legal duty, and if so was it a public duty or a special duty?

The settlement means none of these issues will be explored, but the case raises another interesting question: What is the duty of other fire apparatus that do not even have defibrillators? Is there a legal duty to have a functioning AED on board every engine company?

The engine company in question had an AED. If a fire company is not required to have an AED, but has one – does that create a duty to ensure that the AED is functional? 

Posted in Duty to Act, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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Seattle ordered to pay $12.75 million to firefighter injured in sliding pole accident

A King County, Washington jury ordered the City of Seattle yesterday to pay $12.75 million to a former firefighter who was injured in an unusual sliding pole injury. Click here for article. The injury occurred in 2003, under apparently similar circumstances to a previous incident in 1976. A firefighter not normally assigned to the station, left a darkened dormitory in the middle of the night to use the bathroom, mistook the door to the pole for the door to the bathroom, and fell approximately 15 feet suffering severe injuries.

Often cases such as this are barred by a number of legal doctrines, such as sovereign immunity, workers compensation exclusivity, or statutory immunity, and in many states would be statutorily capped by tort claims acts. No word yet on whether the City will appeal.

Posted in Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence