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Staffing Now At Center Of Columbus Georgia Criminal Probe

Additional details are emerging about the police investigation of the Columbus Fire & EMS that we posted about last week. It appears the primary focus of the investigation relates to the staffing level of the first in engine at a fatal daycare fire in 2010, and whether documents were either falsified or removed.

The fire occurred on February 26, 2010, and claimed the life of 23-month-old Michael Dubard. Firefighters made numerous heroic rescues of other children during the blaze. A total of nine children were in the day care at the time of the fire, which was only allowed to care for six under state law.

The first arriving apparatus, Engine 7, was supposed to be staffed with five firefighters, but responded to fire with only three members. The reason for the discrepancy appears to be at the heart of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI)’s  search.

An internal Columbus Fire & EMS investigation concluded Engine 7 was missing two firefighters because the lieutenant was out with an injury, and minutes before the fire a battalion chief picked up a crew member to take him for a random drug test.

However, the GBI’s search warrant affidavit alleges that Engine 7 was understaffed because both missing firefighters had been taken for drug testing. The affidavit claims that fire department records were altered to show that only one was being drug-tested, while the second was out sick.

More on the story.

Posted in Criminal Law, Disciplinary Action, Evidence, Occupational Safety & Health, Open Records Laws, Staffing

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Georgia Fire Department Is The Focus Of A Major Investigation

The Columbus, Georgia Fire Department is at the center of a probe being conducted by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI). Search warrants have been executed and WTVM is reporting that the investigation is related to a fire in a daycare center that killed a one year old child.

The District Attorney’s Office released the following statement:

“On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 GBI agents served a search warrant for specific records and documentation maintained at Columbus Fire Department Headquarters in Downtown Columbus, Georgia with the assistance of investigators from the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office. Agents also began conducting interviews with specific department employees and members of the command staff.

“These actions were taken as part of an ongoing GBI investigation being conducted at the request of District Attorney Julia Slater. District Attorney Slater requested GBI assistance after receiving information indicating that department employees may have committed criminal acts involving the creation, maintenance and accuracy of official reports and documents.

“The search and interviews are part of an ongoing effort to establish what occurred if criminal conduct was involved. The investigation is active and no other information is being released at this time.”
WTVM.com-Columbus, GA News Weather

Posted in Criminal Law, Evidence, Open Records Laws, Politics

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Fatal Chicago High Rise Fire Prompts Early Court Action

The estate of a man killed in a high rise fire in Chicago last Tuesday, has filed a petition in Cook County Circuit Court to obtain access to 911 tapes and fire reports. The three alarm fire occurred in a 16 story building at 6730 South Shore Drive.

John Fasula, 50, a Chicago Transit Authority employee who worked part time in the building, died heroically in the blaze. He and a second employee, Jameel Johnson, rescued an elderly woman and were reportedly either firefighting the fire with extinguishers or searching for other victims when they were overcome. Johnson died as well.

The petition was filed by on Thursday by Patricia Fasula, the administrator of John’s estate. Besides records from the fire department, the petition also reportedly seeks records from the building’s owners and the police department

Here is more on the fire.

Here is more on the petition.

If there are any Illinois attorneys out there who can explain why it was necessary to file a petition in court 2 days after a fire in order to obtain the 911 and fire department records (that would appear to be public records anyway) please clue the rest of us in. Generally the only time petitions like this are used is when there is a concern that relevant evidence from the scene may be lost, discarded, or not preserved. Perhaps the news reports have the details about the petition wrong or perhaps there is something in Illinois law or practice that explains the reason for the petition.

Posted in Civil Suit, Discovery, Evidence

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Florida Firefighter Facing Extortion Charges

A Florida firefighter is in jail, charged with extortion and related offenses following his threat to release the contents of an illegally recorded private conversation between his fire chief and union president.

Fort Lauderdale firefighter Steve Loleski, 35, a 12 year veteran, was one of 6 firefighters being investigated for fraud in regards to their EMS credentials. The FBI, Fort Lauderdale police, and the State’s Attorney have been investigating.

Loleski allegedly taped a conversation between Fort Lauderdale Fire Chief Jeffrey Justinak and IAFF Local 765 President, William Humphrey six months ago without the consent of all parties as required by Florida law. Florida is one of 12 states that require all parties to a conversation consent to it being recorded.

Loleski was apparently concerned that some of the other firefighters under investigation had cut a deal with the prosecutors, and demanded President Humphrey tell him what was going on or he would release the recording and force him to resign as president. The threat was made on July 9, 2012, and was duly reported to authorities.

During a hearing yesterday, Loleski’s attorney, Brian Silber, told Broward County Judge John Hurley that his client’s actions did not amount to extortion, and that “all he’s accused of doing is threatening to expose a tape. Nothing more,”

The problem is the black letter law definition of extortion:

Extortion is the obtaining of money or property—or otherwise requiring someone to do something they are not legally required to do—by means of a threat. The types of threats sufficient to establish extortion include threats to:

  • inflict future bodily injury, or damage to property
  • accuse another of a crime
  • reveal confidential or embarrassing information about the victim
  • take or withhold any action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold any action

Source: Fire Officers Legal Handbook

Loleski remains in custody and is charged with one count of making threats/extortion and one count of solicitation to commit or use of confidential criminal justice information. It does not appear he has been charged with eavesdropping for the original recording.

More on the story.

Posted in Criminal Law, Disciplinary Action, Evidence, Labor Law, You Can't Make This Stuff Up

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Father of Children Lost in Connecticut Fire Accuses City of Destroying Evidence

Today’s Burning Question: We are at the scene of a fatal fire that claimed the lives of five people. The building is unsafe and needs to be knocked down. Can we order the building to be demolished?

Answer: The authority to demolish fire damaged property is usually determined quite simply by researching state and local law. We now have to add a relatively new consideration: spoliation, and our potential liability for the destruction of evidence relevant to a possible legal proceeding.

In Stamford, Connecticut, the father of three young girls killed in a house fire on Christmas morning, 2011, announced plans to sue city officials for the intentional destruction of evidence when they ordered the demolition of the home on December 26, 2011.

Last Friday, attorney Richard Emery filed a notice of intent to sue Stamford and city officials on behalf of Matthew Badger. Badger’s three daughters died in a fire at the home of their grandparents on Shippan Avenue. The grandparents died as well.

The cause of the fired was rule accidental, and attributed to the careless disposal of fireplace ashes. Besides the spoliation claim, Badger accuses the city of negligence for failing to properly inspect the home, failing to ensure there were proper smoke detectors, and allowing the building (which he characterized as a “plain fire hazard”) to be occupied. The 3,350 square foot home was being renovated at the time of the fire.

Stamford’s Director of Legal Affairs, attorney Joseph Capalbo, was quoted by CTPost.com as saying  “While we believe the allegations against the city and its employees are baseless and without merit, we are mindful of the tragic loss suffered by the Badger family and continue to offer our deepest heartfelt sympathies.”

More on the story.

Posted in Burning Question, Civil Suit, Duty to Act, Evidence, Municipal Liability, Negligence

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NFPA 1710 Staffing and Legal Mandates

Today’s burning question: Are there any Federal laws or requirements that mandate that fire departments comply with or meet NFPA 1710 staffing levels or response times?

Answer: There are no laws that I am aware of on a Federal or state level that directly mandate that  fire departments comply with NFPA 1710.  There are a few jurisdictions that have adopted 1710 on a local level through ordinances.

However, there are two back-door ways that non-compliance with NFPA 1710 can potentially become a legal problem for a fire department.

The first involves OSHA (which in the case of public entities means state OSHA), and the general duty requirement. OSHA places two important responsibilities on employers (with fire departments being employers). The first responsibility is to comply with all OSHA standards. The second is to provide a workplace that is free from “recognized hazards”. This second requirement is known as the general duty requirement.

An employer’s responsibility to meet the general duty requirement is in many ways more complicated than merely complying with OSHA standards. It requires an employer to look at its injury data and take steps to prevent the reoccurrence of preventable accidents. It also requires employers to be aware of industry-wide safety standards that are based on hazards that are recognized in the industry. If a given industry has recognized that certain practices create a hazard to employees, and have adopted safety standards to address those hazards, then violating those standards can be the basis for a general duty clause violation. As such, understaffing fire apparatus in violation of NFPA 1710 could be the basis for an OSHA general duty clause citation.

The second way that non-compliance with NFPA 1710 could become a legal problem has to do with negligence, and the standard of care. NFPA standards such as NFPA 1710 can be used as evidence of the applicable standard of care in a negligence suit. Of course, the reasonableness of the staffing and response times required by NFPA 1710 could be rebutted by expert witnesses, but just as easily they can be supported by expert witnesses as well. On balance, NFPA 1710 does provide an important objective measure of the standard of care that the reasonably prudent fire department would take.

Posted in Burning Question, Evidence, Negligence, Occupational Safety & Health, Staffing

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Joints in Tennessee Station Trigger Drugs Tests and Suspensions

Two Murfreesboro, Tennessee firefighters have been suspended following the discovery of two joints in Station 3 on March 11, 2012. Firefighter Terrell Ellis was suspended the day after the discovery of the joints, which coincidentally was the day that he and other firefighters were ordered to undergo drug testing.

Captain Theodore Pertiller is the other firefighter who was suspended.  A “brown substance” was observed in his locker at Station 3 subsequent to the discovery of the joints. He has since been cleared of wrongdoing following tests conducted by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation.

The TBI has not yet launched a criminal investigation. Here is video coverage of the story.[Sorry - gotta click thru to see video]

Posted in Criminal Law, Disciplinary Action, Evidence, Search and Seizure

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City to Appeal Reinstatement Order of Medic who Flushed Drugs

An Ohio firefighter paramedic who was terminated for taking illegal drugs from an incident scene and later destroying them in 2010, has been ordered reinstated by an arbitrator. North Royalton firefighter Richard Urich responded to the scene of a heroin overdose, and was observed by coworkers to have taken drugs from the scene. Urich claims that he flushed some of the drugs down the toilet and took the rest to the hospital. Additional drugs were discovered in the rescue squad vehicle. He said was acting  out of concern for the safety of a child at the scene.

Following an internal investigation Urich was terminated. He was charged with drug possession and tampering with evidence, but ended up pleading guilty to obstruction of justice.

The firefighters’ union grieved Urich’s termination and on February 16, 2012 an arbitrator concluded that while there was significant evidence to support the discipline, termination was too severe. The ruling ordered Urich reinstated without backpay.

The arbitrator’s decision is not sitting well with city officials, who have decided to appeal the ruling to Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. City Law Director Tom Kelly was quoted extensively in The Post:

“The fact of the matter is that the arbitrator found that this individual had lied repeatedly in a variety of circumstances to a variety of people. Nonetheless, he ordered him back to his job. We are appalled.”

“I personally believe the arbitrator restored his employment largely as a matter of empathy. From our perspective, that’s not a good enough reason to reinstate someone to a position of trust.”

“In our opinion, the conduct this man engaged in is egregious, and we do not believe he should ever work in public service again.”

More on the story.

Posted in Civil Suit, Criminal Law, Disciplinary Action, Evidence, Labor Law, Wrongful termination

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Ohio Fatal Accident Case Raises Some Important Policy Questions

There is a case pending before the Ohio Supreme Court that raises some important considerations for fire departments, and in particular questions about a department’s policy for emergency response driving.

The case arose out of an apparatus accident in Canton, Ohio on July 4, 2007. FF James Coombs was responding to a house fire when the apparatus he was driving struck a vehicle in an intersection and killed the two occupants, Grace and Dale Burlingame.

At the time the apparatus’s siren was not functioning and the unit was responding with lights and sounding its air horn. According to court papers, the apparatus had a red traffic signal and proceeded through the intersection broadsiding the Burlingame vehicle at approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour. The estates of the deceased sued the City of Canton and FF Coombs.

At trial the court granted a summary judgment in favor of the fire department and the driver concluding both were entitled to immunity under Ohio law because at worst FF Coombs was guilty of negligence.  On appeal the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed finding that “reasonable minds could differ” over whether FF Coombs’ driving was “willful, wanton or reckless”, in which case he would not be entitled to immunity protection.

The Court of Appeals decision does an excellent job of explaining negligence, and distinguishing negligence from willful, wanton and reckless conduct.  At issue in the case is whether FF Coombs should have discontinued emergency response due to the loss of the siren, come to a complete stop at the red light, and whether his failure to do so arose to the level of “willful, wanton or reckless” behavior.

Also at issue before the Ohio Supreme Court will be the relevance of the Canton Fire Department’s internal policies and procedures to a determination of the standard of care, as well as the impact of state laws that require fire apparatus to slow down before proceeding through intersections. The trial court ruled that policies and state laws were not relevant to a determination of FF Coombs’ conduct. The Court of Appeals disagreed.

Among the key quotes:

  • Violation of departmental policy or of traffic laws may be a factor for the jury to consider in determining whether the conduct of the defendants rose to the level of wanton or reckless.
  • The laws and policies are designed to make emergency responses safer for the public. However, they also exist for the protection of the firefighters, who already face serious personal risks in their day-to-day jobs, and who must not be further imperiled en route to their humanitarian roles. We find violations of traffic statutes and departmental policies are factors a jury may consider in determining whether Coombs’ actions were reckless.
  • [N]egligence is mere inadvertence, incompetence, lack of skill, or failure to take precautions that would allow the person to cope with a possible or probable future emergency. Reckless consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The person does not intend to cause the harm that results from it but realizes or, from known facts, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though the person hopes or even expects that the conduct will prove harmless. Intentional misconduct occurs when the person intends to cause harm.

This case is important because of a possible implication that some may draw from it. Some may interpret this case as calling into question the wisdom of having written policies if they can be used as a basis to find a firefighter and fire department liable. Do not fall for that trap.

One of the goals of having formal policies is to reduce liability – but not through some sort of magical legal hocus pocus (ie changing the name of SOPs to SOGs). That is nothing more than rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic. The goal of having policies is to reduce the likelihood that an event such as a fatal apparatus accident is going to occur. Good, sound policies supplemented by training and enforced by officers who are unafraid of demonstrating leadership can prevent these types of accidents from occurring. That has to be our goal.

Misunderstanding this case as a call to eliminate or dilute written policies will make these kinds of tragedies more likely, not less likely.

The case was argued before the Ohio Supreme Court on Tuesday.

Here is the Court of Appeals decision. 2011-ohio-1325

More on the story.

Posted in Apparatus, Civil Suit, Evidence, Immunity, Municipal Liability, Negligence, Occupational Safety & Health, Wrongful death

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Seizing Evidence at a CO Incident

Today’s burning question comes from a reader concerned about our legal jurisdiction to seize evidence at a CO incident: We recently responded to a carbon monoxide emergency in a private dwelling. On arrival, there were ten (10) occupants exhibiting signs of CO exposure. The source of the CO was traced to a generator running in the basement. Power to the building had been cut by the local power company due to electrical code violations. The generator had been running unvented for eight (8) days on and off. The CO readings in the structure exceeded 800 ppm.

      Does the fire department have the authority by law, to seize the generator as part of the investigation? The concern by Command on scene was, if the generator is simply removed from the structure, what guarantee would there be that the landlord would not place the generator back in the basement. Does removing the generator outside satisfy the responsibility of the fire department in removing the hazard or addressing the safety of the occupants?

ANSWER: There are 2 issues

1.     Is there grounds for a seizure of the generator

2.     Does the FD to have jurisdiction to investigate the incident.

Let’s take them one at a time.

1.     Grounds for a warrantless seizure: at the scene of a fire the fire department can lawfully seize evidence of the cause and origin in order to preserve it. Unfortunately a CO incident is not a fire in the strictest sense of the word. Police can lawfully seize relevant evidence of a crime that is in plain view. However, seizing an item because someone may later use it improperly is not a lawful grounds for seizure. There may be certain circumstances where the presence of an object or appliance at a scene creates such a hazard to occupants, passers-by, or children (attractive nuisance) that we may need to secure it as a matter of public safety. Seizing the item may be one way of securing it to address public safety. Its probably a stretch in this case.

On the flip side of this, what are the consequences if we wrongfully seize the generator? We could be liable civilly for conversion, trespass to personal property or even a due process/civil rights violation. These actions are unlikely on the facts but they are possible.

2.     Jurisdiction: Most fire departments have a duty to investigate the cause and origin of fires, but beyond that have no legal responsibility/authority to investigate the causes of illnesses or injuries to people – beyond the extent necessary to ensure that the patients are treated and the danger has been mitigated. Assuming we have evacuated/treated the patients, identified the generator as the source of the CO, have it turned off, ventilated the building, and we have warned those involved of the risks – our job is done.

Some states and jurisdictions may grant fire departments greater latitude in investigating the cause of environmental/CO incidents – and if so – seizure of the generator may be authorized in order to preserve evidence relevant to the investigation. I do not think you need to seize the generator in order to prove it was the source of the exposure – but it would probably be valid justification – particularly if there were questions about whether it was running properly, had been modified, etc.

The running of the generator indoors may be a violation of local ordinances or building code regulations and as such the generator could be seized by the building inspector and/or the police as evidence in their investigation. Some states may assign their department of health or department of environmental protection to investigate these cases as well – so those agencies might be in a position to seize the generator as part of their investigation.

Probably the best ones to seize the generator would be the police – assuming they were so inclined. Certainly there is the possibility of reckless endangerment charges against those to set up the generator, particularly if children were present. If it was a landlord who did this to his tenants – he could be prosecuted. However, the police may not be inclined to take that kind of interest in the case in the absence of a death.

If we change the facts in this case slightly we may have a different obligation. Let’s say the generator was not simply unvented – but that it was improperly vented (ie. a contractor vented the exhaust but did so improperly). The generator may very well be relevant to the investigation and to a civil suit between the parties. If we were to disturb the generator and/or the venting by seizing it, we could compromise the ability of the parties to sue and/or defend themselves in court. The term used for destroying evidence is “spoliation of evidence” and if we seize the generator without preserving/addressing the evidentiary considerations we could find ourselves facing liability. This is a growing area of concern for fire investigators at fire scenes and would apply equally here.

Lastly, you mention that the IC didn’t want to leave the generator because the landlord might fire it up again. Obviously – if you leave the generator – the landlord and occupants need to be given a clear warning about the risks. Seizing the generator does not guaranty they won’t go get another one. For that reason, the cautionary warning should be made and well-documented.

Posted in Burning Question, Evidence, Search and Seizure

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Text Messaging and Public Records Laws

Today’s burning question: Our union attended a city council meeting, and during the course of the meeting we observed one of the councilmen texting. Are his texts subject to the public record laws? I mean, wouldn’t it be awesome if we could force him to disclose copies of his text messages?

Answer: Text messages are considered to be subject to the public records laws in most states, but before you start doing backflips be careful about what you wish for. If the councilman has to disclose his work related text messages, then so do you while you are on duty.

The Palm Beach Post ran an interesting story yesterday about text messaging and Florida’s Public Records Law. Under state law, text messages, Facebook comments, Tweets and other forms of electronic communications are considered public records when the content of the messages involves government business.

Take a second to absorb that. The entire area of text messaging/public records is fraught with problems:

  • Does it matter if the message was sent using a government owned device or personally owned device?
  • Do both parties to the message have to consent to its disclosure?
  • How long do I have to maintain text messages in order to comply with the public records law?
  • How exactly do I get the text messages off the cellphone and on to paper so that copies can be made?

No doubt, the devil is in the details… and the details are different depending upon the state, the text messaging service provider, the device used, and the content of the messages.  For example, some providers allow text messages to be forwarded to email addresses for retention purposes, and some can directly archive messages. Software is also available to download text messages from cellphones.

This is an evolving issue where the law has not caught up with the technology, but one that impacts all firefighters and EMS personnel.

More on the story.

 

Posted in Burning Question, Discovery, Ethics, Evidence, Open Records Laws, Politics

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SC Paramedic Charged in Pot Coverup

A South Carolina paramedic who has been under investigation for the past week, was arrested and charged today for her role in taking and concealing marijuana that was in the pocket of an accident victim.

Chelsea Arrowood, 27, of Berkeley County EMS, surrendered to State Highway Patrol this afternoon and was charged with obstruction of justice. On November 10, 2011 she responded to a fatal motor vehicle accident and treated the driver of one of the vehicles, Shana Robinson, 33. Robinson was later charged with felony DWI, death resulting.

Arrowood is accused of taking marijuana from Robinson’s pocket in order to hide it from the police. Investigators subsequently recovered the pot and charged Robinson with possession. Berkeley County EMS has started its own investigation into the incident, and reported that Arrowood is on previously scheduled paid vacation leave.

More on the story.

Posted in Criminal Law, Disciplinary Action, EMS, Evidence

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Hepatitis C Presumption Upheld in Philadelphia Case

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has upheld the widow of a Philadelphia firefighter in her claim that her husband’s Hepatitis C was contracted in the line of duty.

Joseph Kriebel served as a Philadelphia firefighter from 1974 until 2003. He passed away on October 25, 2004, from liver disease caused by Hepatitis C. Patricia Kriebel, filed a workers’ compensation claim following his death claiming that his disease and death were job related.

The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act identifies Hepatitis C as an “occupational disease” for career and volunteer firefighters, and section 301(e) of the Act creates a rebuttable presumption that an occupational disease is causally related to employment.

The city countered Mrs. Kriebel’s claim with evidence from her husband’s military medical file dating back to 1969 indicating that he suffered “serum hepatitis from drug usage”. Unable to produce the doctor who made the note, the city found an expert witness, Dr. Stephen J. Gluckman, M.D, who concluded that Kriebel’s hepatitis was due to intravenous drug usage not exposure as a firefighter.

The Workers Compensation Board concluded Dr. Gluckman’s opinion was based on pure speculation from the note and lacked a factual basis. The city appealed, and a lower Pennsylvania court agreed with the city.

On Mrs. Kriebel’s appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Workers Comp decision, concluding “This Court has stated that reliance on a “presumption on a presumption,” as Employer’s expert has done herein, must be condemned as the height of “irresponsible speculation.”…  Accordingly, we find that Dr. Gluckman’s opinion, which lacks an adequate factual foundation, constitutes nothing but conjecture and speculation.”

Without Dr. Gluckman’s testimony, the statutory presumption was enough for Mrs. Kriebel to prevail on her claim.

To read the Supreme Court decision, click here.

More news on the decision.

 

Posted in Civil Suit, Evidence, Municipal Liability, Occupational Safety & Health, Workers Compensation

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Duty to Act, Right to Enter, Their Well Being, Our Well Being

My friend Michael Morse from Rescuing Providence has posed a new EMS related scenario regarding the right to enter property to check on the well being of a patient.  Recall last month I wrote about a fire department’s right to enter someone’s home when the firefighters believe there is a fire in the building. Believe it or not, the right to enter for EMS related purposes is not the same.

The traditional firefighter’s right of entry comes from common sense as best understood by looking at the history of how cities throughout the world have been decimated by fire. That common sense approach has been incorporated into state and local law that authorizes fire departments to enter people’s property without their consent.

However – the scope of the firefighter’s right of entry is not without limit, and depends on the language of the law. If the statutes are narrowly drawn and limited to a fire situation, then they would not apply to an EMS related entry. If the laws are broad enough to include any type of emergency, then we would have the legal authority to enter to check on the well being of a person.

Rhode Island does not have such a broad right of entry. It is limited to a fire scenario. Take a look:

§ 23-37-1  Police authority of fire company officers at fire – Right of entry. – The chief, chief engineer, assistant engineer, captain, lieutenant, or any other executive officer of any volunteer fire company, association, fire district company, or any other organization organized or created for the purpose of extinguishing fires and preventing fire hazards, whether it is incorporated or not, and whether it is a paid department or not, when on duty at a fire in the city or town where the fire headquarters or station of the company, association, or organization is located or in response to an alarm for such a fire shall, in the absence of the chief of police, have the power to suppress any tumult or disorder and to command from the inhabitants of the city or town all needful assistance for the suppression of fires and in the preservation of property exposed to fire; the officers above enumerated shall also have authority to go onto and enter any property or premises and to do whatever may reasonably be necessary in the performance of their duties while engaged in the work of extinguishing any fire or performing any duties incidental thereto.

However, lets take a step back. What are the consequences if fire or EMS personnel wrongfully (but with good intention) break in to someone’s home or apartment out of a concern for the well being of the person inside?

Criminal charges are not likely because there is no criminal intent. If an overzealous police department and prosecutor file charges against the responders, the time honored defense of justification could be raised to argue that the entry was justified by the circumstances.

Next up would be a civil liability analysis. The most likely civil action to be brought against responders who wrongfully enter a person’s property would be trespass. Unfortunately, personnel could be liable for any damages they cause in making the entry on a trespass theory. Beyond actual damages, the property owner or occupant (in the example the woman who’s friend was concerned) could ask for additional  damages, but assuming responders acted with good faith, that would be a hard sell to a judge and jury.

The woman might also allege negligence, but there would have to be damages and that too would be a tough sell because she would have to prove that the reasonably prudent firefighter, EMT or paramedic would not have made entry under the circumstances.

The only other legal concern that I can think of would be a potential civil rights suit (violation of the 4th Amendment and her right to privacy committed under color of law), but that too seems a bit of a stretch for a good faith entry to check on the well being.

So, to summarize neither criminal law, nor civil liability pose a major legal barrier to a good faith entry.

There are a couple of other legal considerations worth mentioning. An occupant has a right to protect herself from an intruder, so if she were to shoot or otherwise injure one of the responders during the entry, she may be within her rights. Not a good scenario for the good guys to be walking into.

Second, once in the home the responder’s presence may be unlawful for purposes of evidence collection against the occupants. For example, if once inside the responders discover drugs or contraband, it may turn out that the evidence cannot be used against the occupants. The legal analysis is complicated – and I mention it for a specific reason: simply because the police cannot use evidence based on the fact that the entry was illegal, does not mean the decision to enter was wrong. The two decisions are separate and distinct, and criminal case law should not be relied upon by responders to determine whether they should or should not force entry. Just because a case holds that an entry was improper for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes – does not mean the entry was improper for medical aid purposes. Ideally the two should align – and if we consider the situation to constitute exigent circumstances then the 4th Amendment analysis should follow suit – but the bottom line is law enforcement issues should not cloud our decisionmaking.

That’s my overview and I’d open it up to the legal eagles out there for their perspective as well.

Oh yes…. the flip side of this entire case is – what if EMS personnel DO NOT force entry and the patient ends up dying. Have you been following the Alameda discussions on here? The public has a very low tolerance for mistakes that result in someone’s death, and their definition of mistake is quite broad when it comes to their expectations of responders!!!! (I wish it was that broad when it comes to financial decision makers in state and local governments…. but that’s a different story)

We could spend several pages discussing the legal duty to act, several more discussing negligence, and several more discussing immunity and the public duty doctrine. The bottom line question is: WWRPPD – what would the reasonably prudent professional (of like skill and training) do. That is the standard by which you will be judged.  If you are an EMT, you are judged as an EMT; a paramedic is judged as a paramedic, and so on. If the RPP would have forced entry and you choose not to, you may be liable civilly, and perhaps criminally liable… assuming the proximate cause of the death was the failure to enter. If the RPP would not have forced entry, you will not be liable.

In the final analysis, the decision on what the RPP would have done is a question that is left to a jury…………… which in some ways makes it rather difficult to predict.

Posted in Duty to Act, EMS, Evidence, Search and Seizure

Dash Cams and Firefighter Liability

Change comes hard to the fire service. We all know the worn out saying about 200 years of tradition unimpeded by progress. So it is understandable that firefighters in Orange County, Florida sought to block attempts by the fire department to install dash mounted video cameras on apparatus.

The details of the Orange County issue are covered quite well in the video at this link. However, the story raises a question that I am asked about regularly – whether dash cams are advisable from a legal perspective.  I am in favor of dash cams for several reasons. First, they document what happened. For better or for worse, they serve as objective evidence about such matters as: what color was the light, was the apparatus being operated responsibly, and was the other driver not paying attention (a pet peeve).

Second, dash cams force firefighters to recognize something they should already be assuming: they are being videotaped. Not that you need me remind you, but video cameras are everywhere. On virtually every response we go on, someone can be seen taking photos or video of the apparatus as it passes by. Traffic cams and security videos are everywhere. The presence of dash cams are just additional video documentation of firefighters’ activities.

Third, the knowledge that people are being video taped changes people’s behavior…. usually for the better.  I was in a law enforcement class today watching the Rodney King beating video and the inescapable conclusion one get’s from analyzing the video is that the officers involved had no clue that their outrageous behavior was being filmed. In fact, had the officers been aware their misdeeds were being recorded, the entire episode may never have occurred.

Will dash cams result in firefighters being held liable in some cases? Yes, absolutely undeniably yes…  but that alone should not be a deterrent to the use of dash cams. Firefighters should only be held liable when they SHOULD be held liable, when the video evidence shows they were at fault. The more likely scenario – and the one that should cause firefighters to embrace dash cams – is when the video evidence helps to exonerate a firefighter from baseless charges.  The reality is that it has already occurred.

On January 12, 2010, EMT Jason Fait of Penn Township, PA was acquitted of vehicular homicide based in large measure on the dash cam video from the ambulance he was driving in a 2006 accident. There are numerous documented cases of police officers being cleared of groundless accusations based on dash cam evidence.

So that’s my perspective. I think on balance dash cams will help firefighters more than hurt them. Here’s the link to the Orange County video.

 

 

Posted in Apparatus, Civil Suit, Evidence, General legal issues, Labor Law, Negligence

Seattle Firefighter Under Investigation for Falsely Claiming a Disabling Injury

A Seattle firefighter’s $12.8 million judgment against the city as well as his pension may be in jeopardy as the result of an investigation into just how serious his job-related injuries actually are.


In 2003, Firefighter Mark Jones fell down a pole hole at Station 33. It was not his normal station and he was not familair with the station layout. Jones got up during the night to use the bathroom and  fell down the unguarded pole hole resulting in head injuries; back injuries; fractured pelvis, vertebrae, and ribs; and internal injuries to his liver, lungs and bladder. A similar accident had occurred at the same station in 1975.


Jones sued the department for negligence and received a $12.8 million jury verdict. He was also awarded a disability pension.


The city is now seeking to vacate the judgement based upon an investigator’s video of Jones. The news reports about the video make it sound like a clear case of fraud. Take a look for yourself. I am not convinced that it shows a man who can perform the duties of a firefighter – but perhaps there is more to the case. That will ultimately be for a court to determine.



Posted in Civil Suit, Evidence, Negligence, Workers Compensation

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Fireground Photos, Facebook, and Discipline

I received a great question today, and wanted to add it to the online discussion: Have there been any cases or instances of firefighters receiving reprimands or disciplinary action for posting fire pictures on their Facebook page?

Answer: Yes there have been disciplinary actions taken against firefighters for posting fire photos and videos on line. The cases I am aware of occurred in fire departments that had policies on taking and/or posting digital images, and the discipline was over violations of the policies.

In departments that do not have digital imagery policies, most of the discipline cases involve EMS related photos, not fires. The EMS cases involve personnel being disciplined for breaches of confidentiality.

There is a much bigger problem out there that most firefighters have not stopped to consider, called spoliation. When someone who is involved in a law suit or criminal matter has evidence relevant to the proceeding, he/she is under an obligation to preserve that evidence. The destruction or loss of relevant evidence is called spoliation – and is a HUGE potential problem that most firefighters are completely unaware of. If a party to a law suit/criminal proceeding destroys or fails to preserve evidence (commits spoliation) the judge may instruct the jury they may infer that the spoliation was committed because the evidence was favorable to the other side.

A scenario will help explain the problem. Let's say a FD responds to a building fire, and FF Jones (who is on-duty) takes 10 photos at the scene. The next day he posts 5 photos on Facebook, but deletes the others. Later, Mr. Smith is charged with arson for the fire, and his attorneys discover the Facebook photos. They also learn that FF Jones actually took 10 photos but deleted 5 of them. FF Jones has arguably committed spoliation – which could compromise the arson case against Smith. Smith’s attorneys will argue for a jury instruction to the effect that the jury can infer the deleted photos would have shown that Smith was not guilty. The same problem occurs if the building owner were to sue the fire department for negligence in fighting the fire. The destruction of the photos by FF Jones could be held against the fire department. These are just two examples – but hopefully the potential for spoliation problems is evident.

This is a very challenging and emerging area of the law and we cover it in detail in two of the programs I teach through LLRMI, Fire Service Leadership: the Law and Legal Issues, and Managing Fire Service Liability & Safety Best Practices. The bottom line is that all fire departments need a digital imagery policy so that photos and videos can be taken for training and documentation purposes, but concerns over spoliation can be addressed.

Departments should also have a social media policy so that both the fire department administration and the firefighters themselves know what is and is not permissible. Most of the social media discipline cases we see are due to the fact that the line between permissible conduct and “conduct unbecoming” is not clear to everyone beforehand!

Posted in Evidence, General legal issues, Social Media, Web/Tech

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Long Awaited Text Messaging Privacy Decision: City of Ontario v. Quon

Today the US Supreme Court handed down a long awaited decision in the case of City of Ontario v. Quon, addressing an employee’s right to privacy in electronic messages. While the case involved a police officer, the decision has important ramifications for all public employees, including firefighters.

Sergeant Jeff Quon was a SWAT officer for the City of Ontario Police Department. He was issued an Arch Wireless two way pager by the department, capable of sending and receiving text messages. The City had a written policy addressing use of the department computer system and emails that reserved “the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” However, the policy did not mention pagers or text messages.

Quon was told that the pagers and text messages would be treated like emails under the policy, and that police officers could use up to the monthly allotment of characters for messaging purposes. When Quon went over his monthly allotment, Lt. Duke, the officer responsible for the pagers informed him that he needed to pay the overage or else the department would have to examine the text messages to determine if they were work related or personal. Lt. Duke told Quon that as long as he paid the overages, no one would look at the messages. Quon paid the overage.

When the overages continued in subsequent months, Lt. Duke complained to the chief who ordered an investigation to determine whether the monthly allocation was adequate. As part of the investigation, Arch Wireless provided the department with copies of the text messages. At that point it became apparent that Quon had been sending sexually explicit messages to female coworkers, including his wife (a police officer) and another employee (dispatcher) with whom he was romantically involved. An internal affairs investigation was then initiated.

In the mean time, Quon, his wife and the female coworker sued Arch Wireless and the City of Ontario alleging that their privacy rights had been violated. The district court dismissed Arch Wireless from the suit, but concluded that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding that Lt. Duke’s statement that the Department would not review the text messages provided Quon voluntarily paid any overage charges, created a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The US Supreme Court disagreed. Recognizing the importance of the case, as well as the challenge posed by emerging technologies – the Court said:

The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. See id., at 360–361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication devices.  Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior… At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will evolve…

 Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated.

A broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted. It is preferable to dispose of this case on narrower grounds. For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to him by the City; second, petitioners’ review of the transcript constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and third, the principles applicable to a government employer’s search of an employee’s physical office apply with at least the same force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic sphere.

The Court went on to hold:

Under the approach of the O’Connor plurality, when conducted for a “non investigatory, work-related purpos[e]”or for the “investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct,” a government employer’s warrantless search is reasonable if it is “‘justified at its inception’” and if “‘the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of’” the circumstances giving rise to the search. 480 U. S., at 725– 726. The search here satisfied the standard of the O’Connor plurality and was reasonable under that approach.

The search was justified at its inception because there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search [was] necessary for a non investigatory work-related purpose.” Id., at 726. As a jury found, Chief Scharf ordered the search in order to determine whether the character limit on the City’s contract with Arch Wireless was sufficient to meet the City’s needs. This was, as the Ninth Circuit noted, a “legitimate work-related rationale.” 529 F. 3d, at 908. The City and OPD had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand that the City was not paying for extensive personal communications.

As for the scope of the search, reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether Quon’s overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use. The review was also not “‘excessively intrusive.’” O’Connor, supra, at 726 (plurality opinion). Although Quon had gone over his monthly allotment a number of times, OPD requested transcripts for only the months of August and September 2002. While it may have been reasonable as well for OPD to review transcripts of all the months in which Quon exceeded his allowance, it was certainly reasonable for OPD to review messages for just two months in order to obtain a large enough sample to decide whether the character limits were efficacious. And it is worth noting that during his internal affairs investigation, McMahon redacted all messages Quon sent while off duty, a measure which reduced the intrusiveness of any further review of the transcripts.

Furthermore, and again on the assumption that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his messages, the extent of an expectation is relevant to assessing whether the search was too intrusive. See Von Raab, supra, at 671; cf. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 654–657 (1995). Even if he could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages were in all circumstances immune from scrutiny. Quon was told that his messages were subject to auditing. As a law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail an analysis of his on-the-job communications. Under the circumstances, a reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used. Given that the City issued the pagers to Quon and other SWAT Team members in order to help them more quickly respond to crises—and given that Quon had received no assurances of privacy—Quon could have anticipated that it might be necessary for the City to audit pager messages to assess the SWAT Team’s performance in particular emergency situations.

From OPD’s perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life. OPD’s audit of messages on Quon’s employer-provided pager was not nearly as intrusive as a search of his personal e-mail account or pager, or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have been. That the search did reveal intimate details of Quon’s life does not make it unreasonable, for under the circumstances a reasonable employer would not expect that such a review would intrude on such matters. The search was permissible in its scope.

Thus, the Court concluded that Sergeant Quon’s 4th Amendment privacy rights were not violated by the department’s actions.

How does the decision impact fire departments? All fire and emergency service organizations should have a comprehensive written policy that addresses computer and email usage, as well as voice messaging, digital messaging, text messaging, and various other forms of electronic data. This case could just as easily have involved a stored voicemail on a department issued cellphone, a voice message on an office answering system, or a text message sent via a mobile data terminal on a piece of fire apparatus. The policy should specify the extent to which an employee can expect his/her privacy to be respected when using any of these mediums, or in the alternative, clearly state that the department reserves the right to examine, copy, forward, store, save and share with third parties any and all such information.

Another important consideration is the purpose of the search. In Quon, the search was conducted for a legitimate, non-investigatory business related purpose, namely: to determine whether the monthly pager messaging allotment was adequate. Had the search been conducted for purposes of finding criminal activity by the employee, or even for internal disciplinary purposes, the analysis of the court would have been different.

Here is a copy of the decision. Download Ontario v Quon SCT

Posted in Civil Suit, Constitutional Rights, Disciplinary Action, Evidence, Search and Seizure, Web/Tech

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Electronic Monitoring Case: Connecticut

A very interesting case was decided on January 5, 2010 involving the Bridgeport, Connecticut Fire Department. In May of 2007, the city acquired new vehicles for city fire inspectors, and installed GPS devices in order to electronically monitor the movement and location of the vehicles while they were in use. The city monitored the inspectors’ activities using the GPS devices and brought disciplinary actions against inspectors Frank Gerardi and Stephen Vitka.

Gerardi and Vitka filed suit against the city alleging it had violated Connecticut General Statutes § 31-48d which prohibits employers from electronically monitoring employees without prior notice to the employee. They sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief and damages.

(more…)

Posted in Civil Suit, Disciplinary Action, Evidence

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Another Problem with Canine Identifications

On Monday of this week I blogged about the case of a Riverside, California man who spent two years in jail on arson charges that were largely based upon scent evidence obtained using a device known as a scent transfer unit. In theory, the scent transfer unit collects a perpetrators scent from evidence at a scene, deposits it on a gauze pad, which can then be given to a canine to facilitate the tracking of the suspect. The validity of this practice has come under a great deal of scrutiny as seeming innocent people are being charged and in some cases convicted of crimes.

 

On the heels of these tragic cases, comes a further unsettling report on the use of canines to perform “dog scent line-ups”. Reported in the New York Times, it appears that scent line-ups are being called into question following a string of cases where innocent people have been arrested and jailed based in large part on canine identification.

 

Asked to comment on a video of one scent line-up, Robert Coote, who commands a British police canine unit, said “If it was not for the fact that this is a serious matter, I could have been watching a comedy.”

 

Having had the opportunity to discuss these cases with a group of firefighters and non-firefighters at a conference today, most are astounded that in this day and age unreliable practices such as these are used by law enforcement. This sentiment may explain why juries are all too willing to accept these “quack-theories” in court to convict an innocent person: no law enforcement organization would dare use such evidence if it were not reliable. Mind you this issue is not about good intentions, or honest beliefs on the part of the proponents of these tests. That is unquestioned. The problem comes in the lack of scientific reliability to support their use.

Posted in Criminal Law, Evidence, General legal issues

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